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CIVIL PROCEDURE BY CONTRACT: A CONVOLUTED
CONFLUENCE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT AND PUBLIC




"More than mere contract law, however, is involved here."1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is great appeal to the notion that parties to a contract
may provide in their agreement for how certain aspects of any
dispute that may subsequently arise will be resolved. The appeal
is so great, in fact, that both parties and courts have embraced
the use and enforcement of pre-litigation agreements ("PLAs").2
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., 1976, Duke
University; J.D., 1980, Washington University (St. Louis).
** Law Clerk, Justice Frederick Kapala, Illinois Appellate Court, Second District.
B.S., 1995, Northern Illinois University; J.D., 2000, Northern Illinois University College of
Law.
1. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 183 (1972) (emphasis added).
2. To the best of the authors' knowledge, Professor Linda Mullenix coined the phrase
"consensual adjudicatory procedure" in her insightful exploration of the topic. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Pro-
cedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 294 (1988). The authors admit that
"consensual adjudication procedure" has a much nicer "ring" than does "pre-litigation
agreement." Nevertheless, the authors have chosen to use "PLA" because it is important
to distinguish between litigation agreements that waive certain procedural rights before a
conflict arises from waivers made during the course of the litigation. Courts have improp-
erly conflated the two concepts, causing resultant confusion in their consideration of the
enforcement of PLAs. Using venue as an example, we will argue that waiving an objection
to improper venue during the course of litigation should not be equated with agreeing to
an otherwise improper venue in a PLA for two simple reasons. First, the waiver of an ob-
jection to venue during litigation is done at a time when the party is better aware of its
ramifications in terms of expense and convenience relative to the specific dispute at hand.
Second, during litigation there is no danger of unequal bargaining power forcing a party to
accept an awkward or inconvenient venue as there is with a PLA, where a party may have
to either accept or forgo the contract altogether. During litigation, the bargain has been
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These agreements take a variety of forms. Parties may agree to
the forum in which their dispute will be resolved. 3 They may des-
ignate the law that will be applied to the resolution of the dis-
pute.4 Parties may designate what evidence may or may not be
presented as proof of their respective positions and what burden
of proof should govern the weighing of the evidence presented.5
Parties may designate who will resolve their dispute, in terms of
judge or jury.6 And they even may designate that the dispute will
not be heard by a judicial tribunal at all, but rather will be re-
solved outside the courts by means of some form of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR").7
long since struck and breached. If desired, the question of venue is able to be addressed
without the potential benefits of the attendant bargain coloring the decision.
3. By means of the forum selection clause, parties can designate the forum in which
their dispute will be heard. This may include designating a venue in a contractual provi-
sion that will render any other venue improper, even though it is a proper venue within
the venue statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89 (1991) (dismissing an action filed in the West-
ern District of Washington, arguably a proper venue, because of a forum selection clause
designating that "all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or
incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the
State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country"); ac-
cord The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
Additionally, contractual provisions have been considered to be consents to personal ju-
risdiction that would otherwise not pass constitutional scrutiny because of the lack of con-
nection between the defendant and the designated forum. See Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (holding that a contractual provision designating
the wife of one of the owners of plaintiff company as agent for service of process in New
York submitted defendants, farmers from Michigan, to personal jurisdiction in New York).
4. The choice of law provision allows parties to designate the law that will be applied
to their dispute, even though that choice would not be that which choice of law principles
would indicate should control. For further discussion of choice of law provisions, see infra
Part VI.B.2.
5. For example, a contract may specify that evidence in the form of hearsay that
would otherwise be admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception would be inadmissible
unless the declarant were unavailable to testify. See John Kobayashi, Too Little, Too Late:
Use and Abuse of Innocuous Yet Dangerous Evidentiary Doctrines, in 2 ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY: TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1127, 1141-45 (1991); Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of
Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138 (1932).
6. With a jury waiver provision, parties to a contract "agree" that if litigation results
from the contractual agreement, each will forgo their Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury. For further discussion ofjury waivers, see infra Part VI.A.2.
7. Contractual provisions stating that any resultant disputes will be submitted to
arbitration are the PLAs subject to the most congressional control. As will be discussed,
although in the Federal Arbitration Act Congress sought to limit the use of arbitration
agreements in order to preserve a sense of fairness for the parties involved, judicial deci-
sions have eviscerated those protections and extended the legitimate use of arbitration
agreements well beyond what Congress intended. See infra Parts III.B.1 & VI.B.1 (dis-
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When all goes well, and the parties remain satisfied with their
original agreement, much pre-trial maneuvering is avoided.8
Party and judicial economies and efficiencies are protected, and
contractual autonomy is preserved.9 These benefits create an ex-
tremely attractive notion in an era of ever-increasing privatiza-
tion of many previously public functions.' Nevertheless, there is
a certain disquietude when one party seeks to resist the PLA,
especially when that party claims to have had no knowledge of
the provision or no actual choice in assenting to the agreement.
At first glance, it may seem well and good for two corporate en-
tities to agree to a PLA as the result of arm's length bargaining,
most likely with the assistance of counsel. At the same time,
there is a great opportunity for unfairness when the PLA is on
the back of a passenger ticket, in an employment contract, or in a
consumer contract, especially where there are inherent dispari-
ties in the bargaining power of the parties to the contract. There-
fore, any decision to enforce a PLA must balance private contrac-
tual autonomy and the attendant efficiencies of PLAs against the
desire to maintain an aura of fairness, which by necessity must
be the hallmark of a system of public dispute resolution. It is the
authors' contention that this balance has been, at best, ineptly
struck. The result is a hodge-podge approach to the enforcement
of PLAs and an erosion of concerns for fundamental fairness in
the courts.
This article will examine the basic nature of our public system
of dispute resolution and consider what role, if any, there is for
private contracts that alter that system. This article will begin by
tracing the evolution of PLAs from their initial disfavorment by
courts to their wide spread present day acceptance. Also, this ar-
ticle will compare the standards for recognition and enforcement
of PLAs that have been given life by courts to those that are the
creations of deliberative bodies. The main emphasis will be on
discussing how effective the various approaches have been in pre-
cussing arbitration agreements).
8. See Michael J. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Proce-
dure, 25 CORNELL INV'L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (stating that forum selection clauses "have
many virtues," including the promotion of "orderliness and predictability in contractual
relationships").
9. See id. at 52.
10. See id.
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serving fundamental fairness in dispute resolution. It will be the
authors' contention that courts have rushed to embrace most
forms of PLAs, and in so doing have overlooked, if not forsaken,
an underlying concern for fundamental fairness in favor of pres-
ervation of contractual autonomy. Though the PLAs created by
deliberative bodies have sought to better protect fundamental
fairness, this article will discuss how judicial action has largely
eliminated the checks on the utilization of PLAs intended by
Congress. The arbitration clause will be our prime example. Fur-
ther, this article will discuss how the favor with which the judici-
ary embraces PLAs has afforded them a status of "super con-
tract," a status that transcends traditional rules of contract law
and results in near-automatic enforcement by means of specific
performance. Additionally, this article will argue that the recog-
nition and the enforcement of parameters lies in the province of
the legislature. Moreover, because of the mess that the courts
have made out of the question, it is well past time for Congres-
sional action defining the manner and the extent to which the
system of public dispute resolution may be altered by private
agreement. Not only is legislative action long overdue, by tracing
the history of the Federal Arbitration Act, which established rec-
ognition of the arbitration clause, the authors will argue that it is
only Congress, through its Article III power, that has the consti-
tutional authority to create PLAs. The authors will conclude with
some brief suggestions for what Congress should address in the
event it chooses to heed this call to action made in the name of
the preservation of the fundamental fairness of our system of pro-
cedure.
II. A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION: THE NATURE OF A SYSTEM OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
"It is arguable that the proceedings in courts are not there solely
for the convenience of the parties and that it is important for social
reasons to maintain the solemnity and dignity of judicial proceed-
ings regardless of the wishes of the parties."1
There is a fundamental question lurking at the heart of any
11. 1 JOHN HENRY WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiMs AT COMMON LAw, § 7a, at 605 (Pe-
ter Tillers rev. 1983) (emphasis added) [hereinafter WIGMORE].
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consideration of the propriety of pre-litigation agreements: that
is, what is the basic nature of a court-based system of public dis-
pute resolution, and is it such that it should be altered by the pri-
vate agreements of parties seeking redress through it? PLAs of
every kind, arbitration agreements, forum selection clauses,
choice of law provisions, and waivers of trial by jury, have been
examined from nearly every angle. They have been both decried
as mechanisms of oppression of the common man 2 and hailed as
efficient cures for the curse of litigation that wastefully consumes
the time and money of courts and litigants. 3 Those who have
questioned whether various manifestations of PLAs have led or
can lead to unfairness to the party who wishes to resist enforce-
ment have considered many questions. In what situations is it
appropriate to enforce a specific PLA, that is: are there categories
of parties or cases to which enforcement of PLAs should be con-
fined? 4 What should be the standard for determining if and when
an effective waiver of a procedural right has occurred? 5 It has
even been debated as to what is the proper typeface for a PLA or
the proper placement in the contract. 6
All of these questions presume that procedural rules and stat-
utes of the public system of dispute resolution may be privately
altered by contract." Perhaps this question is so fundamental
12. See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival
Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 354-58, 370
(1992) (criticizing the Supreme Courts enforcement of forum selection clauses in consumer
contracts without giving consideration to whether the contract contained elements of ad-
hesion or unconscionability).
13. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 8, at 51-52 (stating that forum selection clauses in-
crease efficiency by "obviating a potentially costly struggle" over jurisdiction and venue
issues at the outset of litigation).
14. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts
After Carnival Cruise. A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REv. 55, 110
(1992) (proposing that forum selection clauses should be enforceable only in contracts in
excess of $50,000 in value and should not be enforceable when contained in contracts for
employment or contracts for goods and services that are outside the scope of the business
or trade of either of the parties).
15. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 12, at 372 (criticizing the judicial doctrines of en-
forcement of PLAs and calling for needed clarification).
16. See, e.g., Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 243 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
valid a limitation of action clause on a cruise ticket folder, in part because of the typeface
and the placement of the clause within the contract).
17. See WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 7a, at 563 n.2 (stating that "courts have not di-
rectly confronted the tension between the values of party autonomy and factfinding reli-
ability," and, therefore, the proper role of private contract in the public dispute resolution
system has never been sufficiently examined because "the scope to be given to the princi-
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that the answer is considered to be obvious. However, the authors
must confess that they do not find this obvious.'" As will be dis-
cussed herein, it was also not obvious to courts which, prior to the
present heyday of PLA enforcement, viewed them as unenforce-
able as contrary to public policy. 9 The judicial embrace of PLAs
quickly glossed over that question, as well as the question as to
whether it is more properly within the province of the courts or
the legislature to determine the proper role of PLAs within the
judicial system. As use and enforcement of PLAs appears to be
proliferating and ready to expand into new and creative areas,
this presumption warrants examination. Certainly a court would
not enforce an agreement to resolve a dispute by judicial coin
toss, the parties not trusting each other to flip the coin fairly. It is
simply too ridiculous and makes a mockery of why the court is
there. But courts will enforce an agreement that the court not
hear the case in favor of arbitration, or enforce an agreement that
determines which court will hear the case or perhaps determines
how the case will be heard in terms of redefining the burden of
proof or the forms of evidence that may or may not be considered.
So where is the line between mockery and efficiency? Or, should
there be any line at all? That is, should a public dispute resolu-
tion system be altered by private agreement?
The rules governing public dispute resolution presumably seek
to strike some adversarial balance between the parties in order to
achieve fairness in process and procedure.2" That balance is con-
tinually being adjusted in order to fine tune how it has been
struck. The notion of notice pleading has sought to keep access to
a judicial remedy from being blocked by cumbersome, arcane pro-
cedures and a necessity to set forth detailed facts that may only
be available from the opposing party.2' This relative ease of com-
ple of party autonomy usually remains altogether unexplained").
18. See id.
19. See infra Part III (discussing the "ouster doctrine" and the view that parties could
not alter the judicial system by contract).
20. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that a pleading need only contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim for relief); FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (providing for the
discretionary imposition of sanctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring certain discovery
disclosures be made "without awaiting a discovery request"); FED. R. CIv. P. 33(a) (limit-
ing the number of interrogatories that may be served upon another party).
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief
contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim...."); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957) (containing the oft quoted phrase that a complaint drafted pursuant to
Rule 8 "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
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mencing a lawsuit has been counterbalanced by a requirement
that every pleading must be well grounded in law and fact.2
Sanctions may follow for a pleading that falls short of this stan-
dard,' but the concept of when sanctions should be imposed, by
whom they may be sought, and for what behavior has been sub-
ject to continual adjustment.24 That adjustment has sought an
adversarial balance between the interests of plaintiff and defen-
dant. In recent years the concept of discovery has undergone sig-
nificant changes in order to make the process less of a game and
to prevent one party from gaining an unfair advantage by making
a game of the disclosure of obviously relevant information and
documents 25 or burying the other party in discovery requests.
26
These changes have not been made without much thought and
debate by all involved in the rulemaking process. It seems trou-
blesome, therefore, that a private agreement may alter, with
court sanction, a balance that has sought to be so carefully at-
tained by rulemakers and the legislature.
Yet, as will be discussed, the history of judicial enforcement of
PLAs shows an ever-increasing deference to them as matters of
private contractual autonomy, and a decreasing concern for their
that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief').
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3).
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
24. The current version of Rule 11 provides that the imposition of sanctions for violat-
ing the rule is discretionary with the court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (providing that "the
court may... impose an appropriate sanction"). The sanction may only be imposed after
the party alleged to have violated the pleading requirement of Rule 11 has been afforded
notice of its alleged violating conduct and given an opportunity to withdraw the offending
pleading during a twenty-one day safe harbor period. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
Under the 1983 version of Rule 11, the imposition of sanctions was mandatory, rather
than discretionary. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983) (revised 1993) (providing that the court
"shall impose... appropriate sanctions" when the rule has been violated). The intention
was to draw attention to the need to impose sanctions to discourage frivolous pleading and
to encourage their imposition. See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11, 97 F.R.D. 165,
199-200 (1983). Additionally, there was no provision for a safe harbor period in the 1983
version of Rule 11.
25. See FED. IL CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(D) (requiring the following disclosures to the op-
posing party, "without awaiting a discovery request": (A) the names and locations of per-
sons "hav[ing] discoverable information"; (B) copies of documents relevant to disputed
facts; (C) "computation of... damages" and copies of relevant documents; and, most inter-
estingly, (D) copies of insurance agreements, even though such agreements would most
likely not be admissible into evidence pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 411).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (limiting the number of interrogatories to twenty-five
that a party may serve upon another party).
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effect on the public system of dispute resolution,27 even though
their enforcement may result in a lawsuit proceeding in a way
that is outside the directives of applicable legislation and rules.28
Further, PLAs now lead a charmed life as "super contract," al-
ways subject to specific performance, capable of redefining the
dispute resolution system in a single bound, and, paradoxically
enough, enforced in a fashion that takes away the autonomy of
the parties to breach the contract and pay the resultant price.2 9
III. THE ADVENT OF THE PRE-LITIGATION AGREEMENT
A. The Ouster Doctrine: What Was It That Was Being Ousted?3°
The idea of a pre-litigation agreement that alters the course of
seeking a judicial remedy was originally met in American courts
with antipathy." Most frequently cited is language from Home
Insurance Co. v. Morse,32 in which the "ouster doctrine" was born:
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and
to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may af-
ford him. A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his
substantial rights.
... [Aigreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction
conferred by law are illegal and void.33
In refusing to enforce a statutorily recognized agreement not to
seek removal of a case to federal court, the opinion made several
other sweeping pronouncements about the inability of parties to
contractually alter the judicial system prior to litigation:
27. See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, VI.A.1, B.1.
28. See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, VI.A.1, VI.B.1.
29. See discussion infra Part VII.
30. For a detailed history of the ouster doctrine as it relates to the forum selection
clause PLA, see David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793-99 (1993).
31. For a discussion of the treatment of PLAs for alternative dispute resolution by
English and early American courts, see Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 599-601 (1997).
32. 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
33. Id. at 451.
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He [a potential litigant] cannot, however, bind himself in advance by
an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his
rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be
presented.
... The regular administration of justice might be greatly im-
peded or interfered with by such stipulations if they were specifically
enforced.
34
Taken either individually or together, these passages speak to
a view of a public system of dispute resolution that may not be
privately altered by contract in advance of the litigation. The
courts are viewed as a neutral arbiter of disputes that must fol-
low a mandated set of rules and procedures to ensure a fimda-
mentally fair forum for public dispute resolution." This view of
the "ouster doctrine" was, perhaps, expressed most clearly twenty
years prior by Chief Justice Shaw in Nute v Hamilton Mutual In-
surance Co.
3 6
The rules to determine in what courts and counties actions may be
brought are fixed, upon considerations of general convenience and
expediency, by general law; to allow them to be changed by the
agreement of the parties would disturb the symmetry of the law, and
interfere with such convenience. Such contracts might be induced by
considerations tending to bring the administration of justice into dis-
repute.
3 7
"The rules" of which Chief Justice Shaw spoke flow from constitu-
tional authority in Article III, as given effect by legislative ac-
tion.8 Private agreement had no place to alter what constitution
and legislature had established.39 This view of the judicial system
was relied upon to deny enforcement to pre-litigation arbitration
agreements and forum selection clauses, for example.4 °
34. Id. at 451-52.
35. See Reuben, supra note 31, at 600 (noting that, when declining to enforce pre-
litigation arbitration agreements, "American judges seemed to be motivated by concerns
for fairness of the judicial process").
36. 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856).
37. Id. at 184.
38. See Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 453.
39. See Nute, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) at 183-84.
40. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrossa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01
(5th Cir. 1958) (holding that private agreements made prior to a dispute that oust a court
ofjurisdiction are contrary to public policy and unenforceable).
10932002]
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B. Brushing Aside the Ouster Doctrine
Whether one agrees with the ouster doctrine's view of the rela-
tionship between private agreements and the public dispute reso-
lution system, the ouster doctrine is not an insignificant concept.
Rather, it defines a fundamental view of the nature of the judicial
system. What is most interesting about arbitration agreements
and forum selection clauses is the very different path each took to
effectuate a shift away from the ouster doctrine's view of the judi-
cial system. Arbitration agreements were given life by legislative
action, essentially negating previous resistance by courts to the
concept of a pre-litigation arbitration agreement.4 ' Forum selec-
tion clauses found recognition and enforcement by way of judicial
decision, apparently allowing a contract to overcome the legisla-
tively determined venue scheme.42 This divergent approach raises
an interesting question as to whether it is appropriate for courts,
legislatures, or both to redefine such a fundamental view of the
nature of procedure. Another interesting point becomes apparent
when comparing legislatively created PLAs to judicially created
PLAs. It is apparent that judicially created PLAs recognize en-
forcement on an almost "all or nothing basis."" Few, if any pro-
tections for the unwitting consumer, employee, or the like have
found their way into the judicially created doctrines.' In contrast,
the doctrines borne from legislative action have tried to offer such
protections, though not always successfully." Certainly this
speaks to a consideration of whether the propriety of PLAs should
be within the province of the courts or the legislature.
1. Recognizing Arbitration Agreements: A Product of Legislative
Action
Arbitration clauses remained unenforceable under the princi-
ple of the "ouster doctrine" until such time as legislative action
41. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act,
which provided for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements).
42. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Supreme Court decisions giving effect to forum
selection clauses).
43. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
44. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
45. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
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made them enforceable in the U.S. Arbitration Act of 1925,46 now
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA). 4 That the legislature should
make the determination that arbitration agreements in advance
of litigation should be enforced by courts is entirely consistent
with the ouster doctrine's view of procedure.48 Parties could not,
by way of private agreement, alter the system of procedure as au-
thorized by Article III and established by Congress. 49 The legisla-
ture may, however, choose to alter the procedural system it has
established." That is, of course, unless some other constitutional
principle is violated by that action. Commentators have argued
that arbitration clauses do just that, violating notions of Due
Process51 and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. 2
2. Recognizing Forum Selection Clauses: Courts Get into the Act
as Well
Forum selection clauses took a very different route around the
ouster doctrine. Though the legislature had defined and refined
where a lawsuit may be maintained53 and how and when a suit
could be moved to a more convenient forum in terms of the inter-
ests of justice,54 no legislative action was taken to recognize and
give judicial enforcement to forum selection clauses. Rather the
Supreme Court did it itself in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co." This was a sea-change in the way private agreement is
viewed in relation to procedure. Yet it was accomplished with lit-
46. The United States Arbitration Act was modeled extensively after the New York
Arbitration Act. See New York Arbitration Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-7514 (Consol. 1988
& Cum. Supp. 2000). For a discussion of the relationship between the New York act and
the U.S. act, see Reuben, supra note 31, at 601.
47. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
48. See id. § 3.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 1; supra Part lI.A infra note 68 and accompanying
text.
50. See U.S. CONST. art I., § 18, cl. 8.
51. See Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American
Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1962 (1996).
52. See Jean Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers,
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 69 (1997).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
54. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
55. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The court determined that forum selection clauses "are prima
facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Id. at 10.
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tle, if any discussion. 6 Though encompassing an entirely different
view as to the relationship between private agreement and public
procedure, The Bremen simply discarded the old view as a "hardly
more than a vestigial legal fiction."57 The Court went on to ex-
plain how no actual "ouster" of jurisdiction was effectuated by a
forum selection clause.5" Rather, the court maintained that it was
in fact exercising its jurisdiction by giving effect to the forum se-
lection clause which necessitated declining to hear the case. 9 Ob-
viously, whether giving effect to the contract amounts to an
"ouster" is mostly a semantic game. But within that game lurks
two fundamental questions that must be addressed in order to
give validity to forum selection clauses: May parties by private
contractual agreement alter the public procedural system estab-
lished by the legislature, and may the courts recognize and en-
force such contracts without legislative approval?
One hundred and fifty years prior to The Bremen, in Cohens v.
Virginia," Chief Justice Marshall pronounced a view of procedure
that is consistent with that of the ouster doctrine.6' The Court
stated, "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution."62 Treason
is perhaps an overstatement. Nonetheless, the basic notion from
the ouster doctrine persists. The legislature, through Article III,
defines the functioning of the courts, and an agreement between
private individuals should not redefine what the legislature has
established.63 The Court in The Bremen simply missed the point.
It viewed the "ouster doctrine" as "judicial resistance" against at-
tempts to reduce the power of the courts.' The decision in The
Bremen invades legislative power, and in doing so, the door is
opened for the current wholesale reworking of the procedural sys-
tem by private agreement. The opinion fails to recognize that the
56. See id.
57. Id. at 12.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 404.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; supra Part III.A; infra note 68 and accompanying
text.
64. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
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power of the courts is not self-defining.65 Rather, it is defined by
the legislature.66 As will be discussed, the legislative history of
the Federal Arbitration Act reveals that Congress held that view
in enacting it, and believed it was acting pursuant to its Article
III power.1
7
IV. WHO MAY ALTER THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE?
"Wle have an old-fashioned belief that the forms of justice
should not be bartered and sold and since, in addition, we have
grave doubts as to whether almost any agreement concerning evi-
dentiary matters entered into before any dispute has arisen is
likely to be substantively fair.""
Whether one is a supporter or detractor of PLAs, it cannot be
disputed that their effect can cause a litigated dispute to proceed
to resolution in a manner other than that provided for in the
statutes and rules that dictate the procedures of the public sys-
tem of dispute resolution. If those procedures are altered, an im-
portant question arises: Who should have the power to cause such
alteration? If separation of powers is to remain vital, the answer
to this question is the legislature and not the courts. Further-
more, if the goal of the current procedural scheme is to foster no-
tions of fundamental fairness,69 the answer should not be the con-
tracting parties, unless it can be assured that the agreement was
freely entered by the parties without coercion and with knowl-
edge as to how the agreement would effect the resolution of a fu-
ture dispute.
65. See id.
66. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
67. See discussion infra Part VIII.A.1.
68. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 563 n.2 (emphasis added). In fairness it must be
noted that Wigmore subscribed to the belief that private contractual autonomy trumped
concerns for procedural fairness and, therefore, that agreements to alter rules of evidence
and/or procedure should be enforced by the courts. See id. at 562 n.2.
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing for the "Scope and Purpose of Rules" and stating
that the rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action").
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A. Not the Courts, If Separation of Powers Is Alive and Well
"It is most true, that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it
should.... We have no more right to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution.
7 0
It is within the sole province of Congress to define the jurisdic-
tional reach of the federal courts.71 Article III sets the fundamen-
tal parameters of the system of procedure in terms of the permis-
sible structure of the system of courts and the types of cases that
are within the subject matter jurisdiction of those courts.7 1 Con-
gress is vested with the authority to enact laws that establish the
court system and jurisdiction to reach within the constitutionally
allowable framework.73 Moreoever, Congress has established the
court system and has defined how it operates in the judicial
code.74 In so doing, Congress has not chosen to extend the juris-
diction of the federal courts to the full extent authorized by Arti-
cle III."5 By means of the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has cho-
sen to delegate to the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence." 6
However, it seems beyond argument that only Congress has the
constitutional authority to define the subject matter jurisdiction
of the courts, and it would be a violation of basic notions of sepa-
ration of powers if the courts were to seek to define or expand
their jurisdictional reach beyond that provided by Congress.77
70. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (emphasis added).
71. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
72. See id.
73. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Bank of the United States v. Halsted, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53 (1825); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 21
(1825).
74. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-4001 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
75. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). While Article III, § 2 provides
for no monetary limit on cases based on diversity of citizenship, Congress has not chosen
to extend diversity jurisdiction that far and has imposed a minimum requirement for the
amount in controversy of such disputes, presently in excess of $75,000. See id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994); see also Halsted, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 61; Wayman,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42.
77. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992) (holding that federal courts
may not extend their judicial power beyond the intentions of Article III); see also Anas-
tasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding Rule 28A(i) of the
Eighth Circuit, which provides that unpublished opinions are not precedent, unconstitu-
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What has been lost from the discussion surrounding PLAs is
the notion that courts must exercise their jurisdiction in situa-
tions where jurisdiction exists. If it violates separation of powers
for courts to expand their jurisdictional reach, it is logical that
not exercising their jurisdictional reach in certain categories of
cases is equally repugnant to the Constitution.
This argument has been raised in the context of the abstention
doctrine, where courts decline to exercise jurisdiction if a consti-
tutional issue rests on an unsettled interpretation of state law or
may be unnecessary for the ultimate determination of the ac-
tion.7' It has additionally been argued in dissent that the Court
appears to be restricting the availability of habeas corpus review
provided by Congress.79 As discussed, this view of the proper roles
of Congress and the courts was at the heart of the original rejec-
tion of PLAs as evidenced by the ouster doctrine." Unfortunately,
the courts have never bothered to resolve, nor even address the
separation of powers question lurking within the ouster doc-
trine."' Rather, they simply chose to ignore it by declaring that no
declination of jurisdiction was occurring, thus saddling them-
selves to the fiction that it was merely the parties that were
"waiving" their jurisdictional opportunities. 2 As will be dis-
cussed, that fiction is false, and the separation of powers question
remains unaddressed. 3
Even if the constitutional scheme of separation of powers did
not give Congress the sole power to define what cases the courts
should or should not hear, the policy considerations lurking
within the enforcement of PLAs would be better addressed by a
deliberative body engaged in public debate. When Congress
tional as a violation of separation of powers because it "expand[s] the judicial power be-
yond the bounds of Article 1I), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (vacating and
remanding to the district court to vacate judgment as moot and noting that the
constitutionality of Rule 28A(i) remains an open question).
78. See generally Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits
of Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). But see Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish
is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985).
79. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Courts decision restricting habeas review "is nothing less than an attempt to
provide a veneer of respectability for an obvious usurpation of Congress' [sic] Art. 11I
power to delineate jurisdiction of the federal courts").
80. See discussion supra Part LI.A.
8L See supra Part I I.B.2.
82. See supra Part HII.B.2.
83. See infra Part IV.B.
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makes laws that define the functioning of the courts, it presuma-
bly acts with the full powers of a deliberative body, pondering,
debating, and considering how the legislation should best be
shaped. When the Supreme Court fashions rules of procedure or
evidence, it is done through the Judicial Conference of the United
States. 4 Most typically a rule finds its beginning in the Advisory
Committee; is reported to the Standing Committee, which solicits
public comments and most likely holds public hearings; is for-
warded to the Supreme Court; and finally is transmitted to Con-
gress."5 The proposed rule takes effect unless Congress acts to
amend or reject it. 6 While this description of the statutory and
rulemaking process is an oversimplification, the point is simply
that the statutes and rules defining the operation of the public
system of dispute resolution are crafted after public debate and
deliberation by public bodies.
The judicial enforcement of a PIA redefines a segment of that
public system. 7 The system then operates outside of the publicly
crafted rules.8 Instead, its operation is governed by a privately
constructed agreement.8 9 In doing so, whatever wisdom gained
from public debate is subverted, or at least ignored. More impor-
tantly, the statutes and rules crafted by the bodies constitution-
ally charged with doing so are rendered inoperable.
It is only in the area of arbitration clauses, where courts re-
fused to enforce arbitration agreements prior to their congres-
sional approval in the Federal Arbitration Act, that the courts
have properly looked to Congress before altering the basic notion
that an aggrieved party may seek redress in the courts.90 How-
84. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
85. See id.
86. See generally WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND
POSSIBILITIES (1981); Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Rulemaking Proce-
dure, 22 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 323 (1991); Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 1961-1963, 77 HARv. L. REV. 601 (1964); Laurens Walker, A
Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993).
87. See infra Part IV.C.
88. See infra Part IV.C.
89. See infra Part IV.C.
90. See U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); see also infra Part VI.B.1. The authors address choice of law agreements
in the context of an enactment by a deliberative body or legislature. See infra Part VI.B.2.
Nevertheless, choice of law agreements differ from arbitration agreements in that they
were recognized and enforced by courts prior to any legislative enactment. See EUGENE F.
SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.2, at 860-62 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the history of
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ever, as will be discussed, the courts have gone far beyond what
Congress authorized.9' With other PLAs, courts have not awaited
congressional action.9 2 Rather, they have taken it upon them-
selves to alter the procedural scheme defined by statute and
rule. 3 A court simply should not, and does not, have the constitu-
tional authority to re-craft the court system.
Somewhat analogously, this rule is echoed by the narrow ex-
tent to which local rulemaking by courts is allowed, through the
use of Rule 83," to authorize each district to make rules govern-
ing practice. Those local rules, however, must be consistent with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Acts of Congress.9 If
there is no controlling rule on a matter of practice, Rule 83 au-
thorizes a judge to regulate practice "in any manner consistent
with" federal law or rules governing procedure. 7 Unfortunately, a
clear picture of what constitutes inconsistency in a federal rule or
law has not been drawn by the Court.9 Nevertheless, Rule 83 re-
flects the notion that there is something of value in the proce-
dural scheme enacted by Congress and the Supreme Court that,
pursuant to its delegated rulemaking authority, is to remain un-
recognition of choice of law agreements, including lack of universal acceptance of the con-
cept of party autonomy and judicial enforcement of the enactments of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 and the UCC § 1-105).
9L See infra Part VIII.A.
92. See supra Part IH.B.2; infra Part VI.A.
93. See supra Part IH.B.2; infra Part VI.A.
94. See FED. R. CIv. P. 83.
95. Id.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) (providing that "[a] local rule shall be consistent with-but
not duplicative of-Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075");
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1995 amendment) (stating that
"[tihis rule is amended to reflect the requirement that local rules be consistent not only
with the national rules but also with Acts of Congress").
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b).
98. The Court has twice considered whether a local rule is "inconsistent" with the fed-
eral rules or statutes. The decisions themselves appear to be inconsistent. In Miner v. At-
lass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), the Court struck down a local rule providing for discovery depo-
sitions in admiralty actions as being inconsistent with the General Admiralty Rules,
which at that time did not provide for such depositions. Id. at 647. The Court stated that
the local rule was a "basic procedural innovation" that should be left to the rulemaking
authority of the Supreme Court. Id. at 650. Thirteen years later in Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149 (1973), the Court upheld a local rule that reduced the number of jurors from
twelve to six, stating that the rule "plainly does not bear on the ultimate outcome of the
litigation." Id. at 163-64 n.23. Colgrove appears to be subject to criticism for conflating the
notions of inconsistency and being outcome determinative.
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altered by both local court rule and judicial interpretation and
decision.99
When a court enforces a PLA, its order allows a private agree-
ment to alter the procedural system established by statute and
rule in a manner that is frequently inconsistent with the publicly
constructed system. For example, a suit may be filed in a contrac-
tually provided-for venue other than the one provided for by the
applicable venue statute.' 0 The authority for the venue becomes
the private contract rather than the public statute.10' Courts have
taken the position that enforcing the contract simply allows par-
ties to waive rights they have in that system, 0 2 as they would
during the course of litigation. 03 As will be discussed below, that
reasoning is not sound, because a pre-litigation waiver is simply
not the equivalent of a waiver made during the course of litiga-
tion.'0 4
At the most fundamental level, a PLA that provides for a law-
suit to proceed in any manner different from that which is pro-
vided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would contra-
vene Rule 1, which provides that "[tihese rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
99. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (holding that discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules did not apply to habeas corpus proceedings and stating that courts
"have no power to rewrite the [r]ules by judicial interpretations").
100. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a forum selection clause that designated venue to be in a specified county
acted so as to confer personal jurisdiction in that court though defendant lacked any con-
tacts with that forum); Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Hqtrs. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912
(11th Cir. 1989) (upholding the exercise of personal jurisdiction on the basis of a forum
selection clause).
101. See Donovan, 916 F.2d at 375.
102. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), an objection to improper
venue is deemed waived unless the defense is raised in the defendant's answer or motion
filed prior to the defendant's answer. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1); see also JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CMIL PROCEDURE § 2.15, at 83 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing that "objec-
tions to the venue of a particular court are waived if not asserted promptly").
103. See Donovan, 916 F.2d at 375 (relying on the argument that "since a defendant is
deemed to waive.., objections to personal jurisdiction or venue simply by not making
them in a timely fashion, a potential defendant can waive such objections in advance of
suit by signing a forum selection clause"); Thayer, 877 F.2d at 921 (stating that "[b]ecause
the nonresident defendant in the present case contractually agreed to personal jurisdiction
in Florida, the usual due process analysis need not be done"); Heller Financial, Inc. v. Mid-
whey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[olbviously, a
valid forum-selection clause, even standing alone, can confer personal jurisdiction").
104. See infra Part IV.B.
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nature." °5 A PLA that addresses an area governed by the rules
makes it, and not the rules, govern the procedure in the district
courts. 6 Interestingly, it is this private control of the public dis-
pute resolution system that is troublesome. The Federal Rules
were enacted, in large part, to establish national uniformity in
procedure and to eliminate technical traps of many then-existing
procedural codes. °7 Unfortunately, PLAs undermine both goals.
First, enforcement of PLAs that vary established judicial pro-
cedures defeats the goal of uniformity by allowing for privately
tailored procedure for individual suits.' ° Procedure in the federal
courts does not vary from state to state;10 9 however, PLAs allow
for variation from suit to suit."0 Secondly, the Federal Rules were
intended to facilitate judicial resolutions based upon the merits of
the case and with a sense of fundamental fairness, rather than
procedural technicalities."' It would seem that the creative use of
a PLA provides the same opportunities for technical advantage
and sharp practices by attorneys that the Federal Rules were in-
tended to prevent."2 The PLA merely shifts the timing so that
these sharp practices occur prior to the dispute rather than dur-
ing the course of litigation.
Nonetheless, the PLA provides opportunities for procedural ad-
vantage not contemplated by rule or statute, turning procedure
away from being the "handmaid" of justice and toward being the
"mistress" of justice."3 While the rules seek to provide a frame-
work for dispute resolution that is fundamentally fair and even-
105. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
106. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
107. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rule-
making, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1972-78 (1989) (providing a history of the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
108. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
109. That is, of course, except to the extent that local rule provides for variation. How-
ever, as discussed, it is the intent of Rule 83 that local rules be consistent with the nation-
ally uniform procedural system. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; 2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.02 (2d ed. 1996) (The real importance of the pleading rules is that they make plead-
ings, in and of themselves, relatively unimportant. Cases are to be decided on the mer-
its.").
112. See infra Part V.
113. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938)
("The relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of a
handmaid rather than mistress." (quoting In re Coles, 1 KB. 1, 4 (1907)).
20021 1103
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1085
handed, PLAs can be used by a party to subvert that goal and
gain strategic advantage by way of contract.
B. Not the Parties, If Waiver Is Recognized as the False Analogy
That It Is
There is a false analogy that is frequently relied upon as justi-
fication for enforcing PLAs: Parties to litigation may waive proce-
dural protections afforded by the procedural system by not rais-
ing them at all."4 For example, though the plaintiff may have
chosen an improper venue or a forum that lacks personal jurisdic-
tion over a party, any objection to the improper venue or lack of
personal jurisdiction is waived if the objection is not raised."5
Further, a request for a trial by jury must be made at the outset
of the litigation or it is waived." 6 Similarly, a timely objection
must be made to inadmissible evidence in order for the admission
of the evidence to be considered reversible error." ' It is therefore
analogized that a PLA that designates a venue for the action that
otherwise would not be proper under the general venue statute,
or selects a forum that would not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant absent the PLA, is simply the same as a waiver
made during litigation by failing to object."' The analogy is false
for several important reasons." 9
First, in each situation above, the waiver in question is specifi-
cally authorized by the established rules of the procedural sys-
tem. 2 ° The concept of waiver by failing to object during litigation
is part of the adversarial balance that has been struck through
114. See FED. R. C1V. P. 12(h)(1) (providing for the waiver of the defenses of lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of
process if not made both timely and properly).
115. See id.
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (providing that the failure to make a timely and proper de-
mand for trial by jury operates as a waiver).
117. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (providing that a ruling admitting or excluding evi-
dence cannot be considered error unless it affects a substantial right and a timely objec-
tion appears on the record).
118. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1990).
119. See, e.g., Kobayashi, supra note 5, at 1145 (stating that stipulations made during
litigation must be distinguished from contracts to alter rules of evidence because, in part,
the stipulations are within judicial control, including the power to relieve parties from
their stipulations).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
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the development and continued refinement of procedural rules.'2 '
The PLA, in which waiver occurs prior to litigation, operates out-
side of that adversarial balance. The rulemakers and statute
drafters may eventually wish to incorporate the PLA concept into
the system, but they have not done so. As discussed, it is not the
place of the courts to do it for them.
122
Second, the timing of the "pre-litigation" and "litigation" forms
of waiver make the situations so different that any possible anal-
ogy between the two is destroyed. The litigation waiver occurs
when the party is likely to be represented by counsel so the deci-
sion to waive an objection by not raising it is more likely to be an
informed decision made as part of an overall litigation strategy.
123
The pre-litigation waiver, made when the precise nature of the
dispute and the parties' goals in resolving the dispute are un-
known, cannot be part of any litigation strategy.
124
Equally important is the fact that the pre-litigation agreement
may not be an informed decision at all. 25 One of the more trou-
bling aspects of PLAs is that they may seem like good ideas when
they are the product of arm's-length bargaining by informed par-
ties with equal bargaining power. 26 However, when the opportu-
nity for bargaining is not realistically present, such as in em-
ployment contracts, franchise agreements, and consumer
transactions, where one party is largely at the disposal of the
other in entering the contract, the coercive aspect of PLAs makes
them seem less a mechanism for efficient resolution of disputes
and more a potential tool for gaining strategic advantage. 27 This
concern has been raised by commentators calling for limitations
on the types of transactions in which forum selection clauses or
arbitration agreements should be enforced.
21
121. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Arvo Van Alstyne, Annotation, Monograph, Tactics and Strategy of
Pleading, 3 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 681 (1965 & Supp. 2001).
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642-43, 675-80 (1996).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. E407 (Mar. 6, 1997) (statement of Rep. Edward J.
Markey) (introducing the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997 by calling for
measures to prevent employment discrimination claims from being involuntarily sent to
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The timing of the litigation waiver removes this coercive aspect
from the litigation waiver. If the party does not wish to waive its
objection to venue, for example, it may seek relief from the court,
a neutral arbiter, by way of motion. 2 9 The party need not risk
forgoing the benefit of an employment contract or a business op-
portunity in order to avoid suit in a far-away forum to resolve any
resulting dispute. Furthermore, the party need not return the
computer he or she has just opened, or return the non-refundable
cruise tickets he or she has just purchased, because of a clause in
computer paperwork,' or language on the back of the ticket lim-
iting the manner or place in which disputes can be resolved.' 31
The bargain has already been struck in the circumstance of the
litigation waiver. In contrast, choosing not to raise an objection
during litigation does not put the entire agreement into jeopardy
as it may in the PLA situation.'32 That is, if the party to the
agreement containing a PLA has any opportunity at all to try and
bargain themselves out of the PLA.
The litigation and pre-litigation waivers are also very different
in terms of dynamics. This significant distinction was recognized
by courts called upon to enforce arbitration agreements. 33 For in-
stance, an agreement to arbitrate that was made in the course of
litigation was recognized and enforced, but a PLA containing a
similar agreement was not.33 Hence, legislative action was neces-
sary to make a public policy decision as to whether the arbitra-
tion PLA should be enforced, and, if so, under what circum-
stances. 35
The FAA arguably tries to accommodate the potentially more
coercive nature of the PLA by proscribing limitations as to types
of cases and parties to which the FAA applies. 36 Unfortunately,
binding arbitration).
129. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
130. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
131. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-95 (1991) (enforcing a fo-
rum selection clause contained in twenty-five paragraphs of boiler-plate language on the
back of non-refundable tickets received after payment by the consumer, which required an
injured citizen of the state of Washington to seek redress only in Florida for injuries suf-
fered in waters off Mexico).
132. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 125, at 644-45.
134. Id.
135. See supra Part III.B.1.
136. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("[Nlothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
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as commentators have decried, the courts have not felt compelled
to restrict the enforcement of arbitration PLAs to those situations
delineated by the legislature. 3 ' Arbitration PLAs have been en-
forced in situations which, arguably, are far afield from any
situations contemplated by the FAA. 3 ' However, the fact that the
courts have extended enforcement of arbitration PLAs does not
relieve Congress of the need to make important policy decisions
about whether it is appropriate for courts to give effect to other
PLAs. Rather, as the courts have gone too far in their affection for
arbitration PLAs, it is even more compelling for Congress to legis-
late in this area.
C. And What About Private Contractual Alteration of the Public
Procedural System?
The extent to which parties should be allowed to alter the
scheme of procedure, especially by means of a PIA, has not re-
ceived much examination. No one would argue that parties can
give subject matter jurisdiction to the courts by means of private
agreement.3 3 But the notion that the same type of agreement
may divest a court's jurisdiction appears to have been assumed
after the ouster doctrine was discarded. 40 It appears to have been
accepted as a given, albeit silently, that the enforcement of PLAs
by courts may result in courts declining to hear cases they would
otherwise be required to hear. Also, it seems odd that this notion
has not been more fully addressed, for rights conferred upon pri-
vate parties in the public interest may not be waived or released
if such would contravene public policy.'' As discussed, PLAs cer-
tainly present the opportunity to disrupt the adversarial balance
sought in a public system of dispute resolution. Yet, the ques-
tion remains largely unaddressed.
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce.").
137. See Sternlight, supra note 52, at 19.
138. See infra PartVI.B.1.
139. See, e.g., Beers v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1988);
McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1985); Riggins v. Riggins, 415 F.2d
1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1969).
140. See supra Part m.B.2.
14L See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704-05 (1945).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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Although one might expect the Federal Rules to address
whether private alteration was within the scheme of public pro-
cedure, the commentary surrounding their adoption does not re-
veal any clues as to whether PLAs were contemplated.1 3 Rule
29,1' however, stands out as somewhat of a puzzlement, espe-
cially for those inclined to support the modification of the proce-
dural scheme by means of private agreement. Similarly, the
manner in which courts respond to party stipulation reflect an at-
titude toward private agreement that is very different than that
evidenced by the near wholesale enforcement of PLAs. Rule 29
provides that parties may enter stipulations that modify discov-
ery procedures provided for in the Federal Rules.' In its present
formulation, the rule allows parties to enter written stipulations
that vary deposition procedures as well as other procedures re-
garding discovery.146 After its original formulation in 1938, the
143. See O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 704-05 ("[Wihether the statutory right may be waived de-
pends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute.").
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 29.
145. Id. See generally Jay E. Grenig, Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure, 21
AM. J. OF TRIAL ADvoc. 547 (1998) (discussing the history and function of Rule 29 in
depth).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 29 provides:
Unless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written stipula-
tion (1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time
or place, upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used
like other depositions, and (2) modify other procedures governing or limita-
tions placed upon discovery, except that stipulations extending the time pro-
vided in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for responses to discovery may, if they would in-
terfere with any time set for completion of discovery, for hearing of a motion,
or for trial, be made only with the approval of the court.
Id. The Advisory Committee Notes are interesting in the view they reflect as to the ability
of private agreement to alter rules of procedure.
There is no provision for stipulations varying the procedures by which meth-
ods of discovery other than depositions are governed. It is common practice
for parties to agree on such variations, and the amendment recognizes such
agreements and provides a formal mechanism in the rules for giving them ef-
fect. Any stipulation varying the procedures may be superseded by court or-
der, and stipulations extending the time for response to discovery under
Rules 33, 34, and 36 require court approval.
FED. R. Civ. P. 29 advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
This rule is revised to give greater opportunity for litigants to agree upon
modifications to the procedures governing discovery or to limitations upon
discovery. Counsel are encouraged to agree on less expensive and
time-consuming methods to obtain information, as through voluntary ex-
change of documents, use of interviews in lieu of depositions, etc. Likewise,
when more depositions or interrogatories are needed than allowed under
these rules or when more time is needed to complete a deposition than al-
lowed under a local rule, they can, by agreeing to the additional discovery,
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rule was amended in both 1970 and 1993 to provide greater
breadth concerning what the parties may modify and to require
less judicial approval for discovery modification by way of stipula-
tion. 47
In one respect, Rule 29 could be read as if the rulemakers con-
sidered that special authorization needed to be provided for par-
ties to alter the procedural scheme."4 While recognizing that "[ilt
is common practice for parties" to enter private agreements that
alter the discovery scheme contained in the Federal Rules, the
1970 amendment states that it "recognizes such agreements and
provides a formal mechanism... for giving them effect."' It is
eliminate the need for a special motion addressed to the court.
Under the revised rule, the litigants ordinarily are not required to obtain the
court's approval of these stipulations. By order or local rule, the court can,
however, direct that its approval be obtained for particular types of stipula-
tions; and, in any event, approval must be obtained if a stipulation to extend
the 30-day period for responding to interrogatories, requests for production,
or requests for admissions would interfere with dates set by the court for
completing discovery, for hearing of a motion, or for trial.
FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee's note (1993 amendment).
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
There is no provision for stipulations varying the procedures by which meth-
ods of discovery other than depositions are governed. It is common practice
for parties to agree on such variations, and the amendment recognizes such
agreements and provides a formal mechanism in the rules for giving them ef-
fect. Any stipulation varying the procedures may be superseded by court or-
der, and stipulations extending the time for response to discovery under
Rules 33, 34, and 36 require court approval.
Id.
148. Rule 29 is not the only instance in the Federal Rules where stipulations by parties
relative to procedure are contemplated. Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend its
pleading: (1) after the service of a responsive pleading, or the passage of twenty days if no
responsive pleading is permitted; (2) upon leave of court; or (3) with the consent of the ad-
verse party. FED. R CiV. P 15(a). Similarly, Rule 26(a) provides for initial discovery disclo-
sures to be made at or within ten days of the Rule 26(f) discovery conference. FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(a). Rule 26(f)(1) and (3) provide for party agreement changing the timing of initial
disclosures and other limitations on discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1), (3).
While one might be tempted to distinguish the stipulation contemplated by Rule 29 from
those contemplated by Rules 15(a) and 26(a) as to breadth or impact on the structure of
the procedural system, the scheme of all three rules seems consistent. That is, express au-
thorization by the rules seems to be required in order to allow parties to alter their proce-
dural structure.
The scheme of authorizing party stipulations to alter procedure is not unique to the
Federal Rules. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules governing discovery, for example, provide
for limitations on length of depositions, ILL. Sup. CT. R. 206(d), number of interrogatories,
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 212(c), and timing of initial disclosures, ILL. Sup. CT. R. 222(c), all of
which may be subject to alteration by stipulation or agreement of the parties.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 29 advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
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odd that Rule 29 is needed for litigation waivers if it is already
accepted that parties may reorder any or all procedures by means
of a PLA. Within the Rule is the notion that, although it was
common practice for parties to enter such agreements, the Rules
needed to "recognize" them and to provide a "formal mecha-
nism..., for giving them effect." 50 This is the same view of the
procedural system reflected in the ouster doctrine. 5' That is, the
public system of dispute resolution is established by the legisla-
ture to provide a neutral forum for resolution of disputes, and the
parties may not alter that system without doing injustice to the
neutrality sought by the rules and statutes that govern it.' 52
If the drafters and revisers of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure felt that Rule 29 was needed to clarify that parties could by
written stipulation modify discovery procedures,'53 how can the
courts believe that other aspects of procedure can be privately
modified without similar authorization? Of course, when one of
the parties to the PLA chooses to ignore it and seek relief in a
court, even though an arbitration agreement specifies otherwise,
or files an action in a venue other than that specified by a forum
selection clause, the party seeking to enforce the PLA must resort
to a court to have the PLA enforced.'54 However, the difference
between the PLA situation and Rule 29 is the degree of scrutiny
given the agreement of the parties. As will be discussed, PLAs,
especially forum selection clauses, are given near automatic en-
forcement.'55 Stipulations under Rule 29 need not be recognized
by the court and may be superseded.'56
Even if one were not inclined to read as much into the reason
for the presence of Rule 29, it must be acknowledged that, at
least, the rule stands for the notion that private, procedure-
altering agreements should be subject to some recognition and en-
forcement under the rules. By so doing, the Rules can set the pa-
rameters for enforcement. Even though the 1993 amendment to
Rule 29 eliminated the requirement for court approval of all dis-
150. Id.
151. See supra Part IIL_
152. See supra Part III.A.
153. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Defendant's Participation in Action as
Waiver of Right to Arbitration of Dispute Involved Therein, 98 A.L.R. 3d 767 (1980).
155. See infra Part V.
156. See FED. R. Csv. P. 29 advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
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covery stipulations,'57 the enforcement of these stipulations is not
limitless. Court approval is expressly required for particular
types of stipulations, such as those that alter established time
schedules. 5 ' Rule 29 at least instructs that, even in a climate
that encourages private agreements for expediency purposes, it is
important to set parameters for those agreements. 59 Their scope
and use should not be limitless and should be the subject of rea-
soned debate by a deliberative body.
It is only in the area of arbitration that Congress has legislated
the judicial enforcement of PLAs and set parameters for so do-
ing. 60 It would follow that without legislative authorization for
enforcement of PLAs in other areas, the courts are overstepping
their boundaries in enforcing them.' Equally puzzling is the ex-
tent to which courts are willing to defer to private agreement
when they do enforce PLAs.'6 2 In some respects, it seems unparal-
leled. In considering stipulations made during the less coercive
setting of litigation, the general rule is that courts will enforce
stipulations as to facts. 63 As to matters of law, however, courts do
not defer to party wishes.'64 It is difficult to imagine what could
be more a matter of law than the basic functioning of the proce-
dural system. Nevertheless, courts have granted nearly wholesale
enforcement to PLAs related to many significant aspects of the
procedural system. Consequently, the proper role of PLAs within
the judicial system is simply in a highly confused state at the
moment.
157. See id. advisory committee's note (1993 amendment).
158. See id. advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
159. Id.
160. See supra Part III.B.1.
161. See Hosking v. Carrier Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 617 (Cal. Ct App. 1996), where the
court stated:
The adoption of judicial procedures for the resolution of litigation is patently
among the "sovereign powers" of the state, the reservation of which must be
read into every contract "as a fimdamental principle of law." Therefore, ex-
cept where the Legislature has granted contracting parties the power to de-
termine procedural matters-as it has done with agreements to arbitrate-
they lack that power. Nor can they reasonably expect otherwise.
Id. at 624.
162, See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
163. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Stipulations § 18 (1974 & Supp. 2001) (discussing
court enforcement of stipulations of facts and issues).
164. See id. § 5 ("It has generally been stated that the resolution of questions of law
rests upon the court, uninfluenced by stipulations of the parties, and accordingly, virtually
all jurisdictions recognize that stipulations as to the law are invalid and ineffective.")
(footnote omitted).
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V. PROCEDURE Is NOT WITHOUT IMPORTANCE
"[Elvidentiary rules are in some sense inappropriate 'commodi-
ties' for bargaining between private parties and that in some sense
rules of evidence involve fundamental aspects of justice that may
not be bargained away."16
Lurking not so subtly behind the judicial embrace of PLAs is
the notion that procedure is not really that important. When con-
sidering enforcement of a forum selection clause, a conflicting
statutory venue requirement often has been referred to by courts
as "merely a venue requirement."'66 The use of the word "mere"
implies a judicial disparagement for a statutory scheme designed
to place a lawsuit in a court that bears some relationship to the
lawsuit and is convenient or fair for the parties. For the defen-
dant hailed into a distant, inconvenient court, venue provisions
would not be viewed as "mere" requirements. Nevertheless, if the
courts view procedure as a lesser body of law than substantive
provisions it is easier for a court to enforce a PLA that alters the
procedural landscape.
Such a view of procedure, however, is mistaken. 167 Even con-
sidering litigation outside the context of PLAs, an attorney with
superior knowledge of procedure can gain a strategic advantage
for his or her client. Adding PLAs to the consideration can allow a
165. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 600 (emphasis added).
166. F.D. Rich Co. v. Indust. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 125 (1974); accord United
States ex rel. B & D Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 1115,
1117 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Three circuits have addressed forum selection clauses that conflict
with the Miller Act's venue provisions. All three have held that as a mere venue require-
ment, 270b(b) is subject to contractual waiver by a valid forum selection clause."); FGS
Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Miller
Act's venue requirement could be waived by defendants); United States ex rel. Pittsburgh
Tank & Tower, Inc. v. G & C Enters., 62 F.3d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
Miller Act's venue provision is subject to contractual waiver through a valid forum selec-
tion agreement); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
that the case for overriding the Miller Act was particularly strong where forum selection
clause was suggested by defendants, the parties for whom the act was designed to protect).
167. But see CHARLES McGUFFEY HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING IN AMERICA & ENGLAND 20 (1897) (stating that civil procedure is adjective law
that "exists for the sake of something else").
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party to gain advantage by definition. 6 ' Two oft-cited quotes sup-
port this view: 69
[Wihat substantive law says should be means nothing except in
terms of what procedure says that you can make real.17 °
I'll let you write the substance... and you let me write the proce-
dure, and I'll screw you every time.171
Enforcing a PLA does not simply give effect to a private agree-
ment for the sake of efficiency. Rather, enforcing a PLA can give a
party a distinct strategic advantage that can change or perhaps
dictate the outcome of a case. It should not be done lightly, nor
without deliberation as to the scope of propriety of recognition
and enforcement. It should not be done as inartfully as it has
been done.
VI. COMPARING TWO INARTFUL ATTEMPTS AT FAIRLY BALANCING
CONTRACT AND PROCEDURE: THE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE
APPROACHES TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PLAS
Enforcement of PLAs has largely devolved from a question of
whether such private agreements improperly impinge upon the
structure of the public procedural system to a question of en-
forcement of a contract. As a result, civil procedure has taken a
backseat to contract. However, contract law does not provide an
avenue for sufficient considerations of fairness that a procedural
system requires. Of course, standard contract defenses such as
fraud and overreaching are available to a party seeking to avoid
the enforcement of a PLA.172 As the shift of emphasis to contract
law has occurred, consideration about whether a PLA is funda-
mentally fair and equitable for the resolution of a given dispute
has been given short shrift.
168. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Proce-
dural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 391 (1992).
169. See, e.g., id. at 387.
170. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 18 (1960).
171. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Law and Regulatory Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
172. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (discussing that a
forum selection clause would not be enforced if it "was invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching").
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That is not to say, however, that considerations concerning
fairness in enforcement have been entirely forgotten. Different
PLAs reflect various approaches as to how to account for some
sense of procedural fairness-some the product of judicial deci-
sion,173 some from the legislature,17 and some imposed by the
Constitution.175 A survey of these approaches demonstrates that
they are very inconsistent and not very satisfactory in terms of
preserving a sense of procedural fairness. Of course, one can ar-
gue that because PLAs address a wide range of aspects of proce-
dure, ranging from venue, to right to a jury, to whether a party
may resort to a court at all, and because PLAs touch upon statu-
tory rights, constitutional rights, and rights established by rule,
that consistency is neither warranted nor desirable. What is con-
sistent, however, is that each involves the same fundamental
questions-whether parties alter the procedural system by means
of a pre-dispute agreement, and, in so doing, whether faith in the
fundamental fairness of the system can be preserved. Those ques-
tions necessitate a consistent answer for the PLA dilemma. At
present, the answers are a convoluted confluence of contract and
procedure that has not satisfactorily addressed, let alone an-
swered, those fundamental questions.
A. Two Judicial Creations: One Constitutionally Restrained, One
With No Restraint
1. Forum Selection Clauses: The Free-Wheeling Judicial Model
The judicially created doctrine for determining when it is ap-
propriate to enforce a forum selection clause offers the least pro-
cedural protection in terms of fundamental fairness of any of the
PLAs. In The Bremen, the Court held forum selection clauses to
be "prima facie valid and [they] should be enforced unless en-
forcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable'
under the circumstances." 76 Presumably, somewhere within the
concept of "unreasonable" exists the notion that fundamental
fairness deserves at least some protection. For two reasons, the
173. See supra Part III.B.2.
174. See supra Part III.B.1.
175. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
176. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
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specter of that protection has fallen within the shadows. First,
the Court placed the burden on the party "resisting" the clause to
show it would be "unreasonable" to do so. 7' Second, the Court ex-
plained that a forum selection clause was unreasonable when the
contractually designated forum was "so gravely difficult and in-
convenient that he [the resisting party] will for all practical pur-
poses be deprived of his day in court."'78 Indeed, this has proven
to provide little protection for basic procedural fairness because
forum selection clauses are routinely enforced in near automatic
fashion,'79 and without apparent regard for fairness.8 0
This lack of judicial concern for fairness was well demonstrated
in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.' In that case, the Court
enforced a forum selection clause found among twenty-five para-
graphs of boilerplate language on the back of a non-refundable
cruise ship ticket.8 2 The plaintiff, though found by the court be-
low to be "physically and financially incapable"8 3 of pursuing her
suit in the contractually designated forum of Florida, was never-
theless held to the agreement and required to do just that if she
wanted to pursue a judicial remedy."8
It is difficult to view this decision as anything close to fair,8 5
yet the Court found fairness based on the conservation of judicial
177. Id.
178. Id. at 18.
179. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 8, at 52 (noting that the judicial trend is for almost
invariable enforcement of forum selection clauses); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Za-
pata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity
Cases, 66 N.Y.U L. REV. 422, 432 (1991) (contending that lower courts enforce forum selec-
tion clauses "almost reflexly").
180. See Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1991)
(enforcing a forum selection clause in a contract for employment designating Saudi Arabia
as the exclusive forum in a suit between an American former employee and a Delaware
corporation filed after termination of employee's contract in Saudi Arabia and his orders to
leave the country, because the employee did not demonstrate that it would be gravely dif-
ficult for him to file suit in Saudi Arabia).
181. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
182. Id. at 585.
183. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).
184. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 585.
185. The decision has been soundly criticized. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 12, at 342
(referring to the case as a "patently bad... decision" and stating that "each rationale the
Court offered in support of its holding cannot withstand legal analysis or intuitive com-
mon sense"); Richard A. Ganter, Note, Absent Bad Faith, Fraud or Overreaching, A Rea-
sonable Forum Selection Clause in a Commercial Cruise Form Contract is Enforceable, 22
SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 539 (1992) (stating that "it is difficult to support the Court's de-
termination to allow the cruise line's interests in convenience and lowered costs to inter-
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and litigant resources and the fact that the predictability afforded
to Carnival Cruise Lines because of the forum selection clause
would result in reduced cruise ship fares." 6
An illusory reduction in fares to all passengers is hardly the
type of fairness intended by the statutes and rules that comprise
the structure of the procedural system. Although the legislature
had enacted a statutory scheme for determining a convenient and
presumably fair forum for this action,8 7 the Court enforced a one-
sided private contract that ignored the structure of the public
court system as determined by the legislature.'88 This is an in-
adequate protection of fundamental fairness.
2. Jury Waiver: A Judicial Creation Tempered by Constitutional
Restraint
Recognition and enforcement of PLAs providing for a waiver of
right to trial by jury8 9 follows a history very close to that of the
forum selection clause. One significant difference, however, is
that judicial doctrine surrounding jury waivers has incorporated
a constitutional dimension, thereby requiring an enforceable
waiver to be the product of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
decision by the parties to the agreement.9 ° Therefore, the Sev-
enth Amendment right to trial by jury 9' has injected a considera-
tion for fundamental fairness into the recognition and enforce-
ment analysis. A party is not held to its waiver unless that party
knew and appreciated what it was doing by executing the
waiver.192 This stands in sharp contrast to the forum selection
clause. Though frequently hidden within boilerplate language,
the contract provision fixing the location of subsequent lawsuits
is given enforcement in situations where it could not be said that
fere with the Shutes' lawful and valid interest in pursuing their legal claim").
186. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593-94.
187. See id. at 595.
188. See id. at 597.
189. Jury waivers are pre-dispute contractual provisions that waive the rights of the
parties to the agreement to seek a trial by jury to redress subsequent disputes related to
the contract.
190. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
191. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
192. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
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the agreement was part of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
decision.' 93
The jury waiver, like the forum selection clause, was first dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Home Insurance Co. v. Morse.'94
The Court stated that "[t]here is no sound principle upon which
such agreements [pre-dispute contracts that waive the right to a
subsequent jury demand] can be specifically enforced."' 95 The
ability to waive the right to trial jury in an existing dispute was
clearly distinguished from attempts to waive such rights in pre-
dispute agreements:
In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his'own consent
to an arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge .... In these as-
pects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be
entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agree-
ment, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at
all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be pre-
sented.
19 6
Recognition of the difference between waivers made during the
dispute and those made pre-dispute is critical, especially for pur-
poses of assessing whether a given waiver was "intelligent."
When made during the dispute, that party waiving the right to
object to an improper venue or waiving the right to demand a
trial by jury does so with knowledge of the precise nature of the
dispute. The party has the opportunity to assess how the given
waiver will impact the ability of the party to seek redress in the
courts. When the waiver is made prior to the dispute, both the
nature of the dispute and the impact of the waiver are obviously
unknown. The failure to recognize and appreciate this difference
has plagued the development of a meaningful judicial approach to
PLAs.
197
The enforcement of PLA jury waivers in the federal courts,' 9 as
with forum selection clauses, finds its origins in National Equip-
193. See supra Part VI..1.
194. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
195. Id. at 450.
196. Id. at 451.
197. See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
198. Because the right to trial by jury is rooted in the Seventh Amendment, which is
not binding upon the states, recognition of jury waivers in the states is not consistent with
that in the federal courts, but rather, must account for whatever right to jury trial exists
in the applicable state constitution. For example, the California Constitution has been
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ment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,'99 in which the Supreme Court up-
held the enforcement of a contractual waiver of service of proc-
ess.200 In a different case, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Hendrix,2"' involving the same party0 2 and relying upon the prior
decision involving it, the Second Circuit overcame the judicial an-
tipathy expressed in Morse toward pre-dispute jury waivers, yet
nevertheless refused enforcement in the situation before it.203 The
constitutional dimension to the right to trial by jury caused the
Second Circuit to view this as being "far more fundamental than
the right to personal service [of process]."24 Therefore, the jury
waiver was not enforced because it was not established that "its
relinquishment [wals knowing and intentional."2"5 Interestingly,
the Second Circuit quoted Justice Black's dissent in Szukhent ob-
jecting to the PLA having been hidden within the terms of the
contract in language a layperson might not appreciate nor fully
comprehend:
[T]his printed form provision buried in a multitude of words is too
weak an imitation of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver
of so important a constitutional safeguard. . . it exhausts credulity
to think that they or any other layman reading these legalistic words
would have known or even suspected that they amounted to [such]
an agreement.
20 6
It is this concern for whether all parties to the agreement know
and appreciate the effect of the agreement that is at the heart of
concern for the judicial rush to embrace PLAs. But absent the
constitutional dimension of the right to jury trial, that concern
has remained secondary to the interest in private autonomy of
contract. It is curious, however, that the right to service of proc-
ess, rooted in fundamental due process, is somehow viewed as be-
held to not prohibit contractual jury waivers. Trizec Props., Inc. v. Superior Court, 280
Cal. Rptr. 885, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that the
Georgia Constitution and applicable statutes prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute jury
waivers. Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994).
199. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
200. Id. at 314.
201. 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
202. The legal staff at National Equipment Rental, Ltd. must have been extremely pre-
scient in anticipating the future for PLAs in American public dispute resolution.
203. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258.
204. Id. at 258 n.1.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 258 (quoting Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szuhkent, 375 U.S. 311, 322-33
(1945) (Black, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
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ing less of a right deserving of protection than the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury. °7
Pre-dispute jury waivers have yet to receive Supreme Court
scrutiny. The decisions of lower courts addressing enforcement
have followed the Hendrix approach requiring a waiver that is
something more than part of boilerplate language hidden among
other terms. °8 How the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent stan-
dard is applied, however, is not without variations. Questions ex-
ist as to whether the standard encompasses two or three ele-
ments, as well as what factors are within the consideration of
those elements.0 9 There also exist differences as to which party,
the one seeking enforcement or the one seeking relief from the
jury waiver, bears the burden as to the question of enforce-
ment.210 In Hendrix, the Second Circuit placed the burden upon
the party seeking enforcement,21' but the circuits are split on the
issue.212
Despite these unsettled issues, it can be stated generally that
for a jury waiver to be enforced there must be some assent to the
agreement by the parties that involves a more knowing and vol-
untary decision than is required for enforcement of a forum selec-
tion clause or an arbitration agreement.213 The significant differ-
207. See id. at 258 n.1.
208. See id.; see also Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986)
(knowing and intentional, voluntary, and informed); Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broad-
casting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 1994) (knowing, voluntary, and intelligent),
affd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished decision); Okura & Co. v. Careau Group,
783 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (knowing, voluntary, and intelligent); Standard
Wire & Cable Co. v. Ameritrust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 368, 375 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent).
209. See Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial Restraint in Interpreting Con-
tractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 431, 449-52 (1997)
(analyzing how courts have interpreted and applied the knowing, voluntary, and intelli-
gent standard to jury waivers differently).
210. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil
Cases, 92 A-L.R. FED. 688, 694-97 (1989 & Supp. 2000) (listing how the circuits have ap-
plied the burden).
211. See Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258.
212. See Coop. Fin. Ass'n v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1171-72 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (out-
lining the circuit split).
213. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 910-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding a jury waiver in a passenger ticket was not knowing in circumstances simi-
lar to that of the forum selection clause held enforceable in Carnival Cruise Lines); Wbirl-
pool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06 (N.D. flI. 1994) (holding a jury
waiver not knowing because the waiver was not conspicuous enough, though the waiver
was contained in capital letters and more conspicuous than the forum selection clause on
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ence in these judicially created PLAs is justified by the difference
between the express Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury
and the more vague due process right to personal service of proc-
ess. Although both have been held to be subject to waiver, the ex-
press constitutional right appears to require a more knowing and
intelligent waiver.214 This distinction is simply not justified.
Waiving the right to object to an inconvenient forum can put a
party at a greater procedural disadvantage than having a case
relegated to a bench trial instead of a jury trial. At least the dis-
pute has a hearing somewhere that the party can attend. It also
may be overlooked that, ultimately, each situation results in the
public dispute resolution system being altered by private agree-
ment in a way that may greatly disadvantage one party in favor
of another. In order to preserve public faith in that system, the
standard for enforcement of such alterations should be the more
strict standard of "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." Unfortu-
nately, the judicially created doctrine has missed the mark in de-
veloping a consistent approach to PLAs.
B. The Approaches of Two Deliberative Bodies: One Run Amuck,
One Reasonable
1. Arbitration Clauses: A Legislative Creation Judicially Run
Amuck
"[Olver the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of
ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own
creation."215
Arbitration clauses, agreements entered prior to the existence
of a dispute by which the parties agree to resolve any resultant
dispute by means of arbitration rather than litigation,216 were
given congressional sanction by the FAA.217 Therefore, they stand
the ticket in Carnival Cruise Lines).
214. See Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258.
215. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (emphasis added).
216. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
217. See id. §§ 1-16 (2000). The heart of the FAA lies in section 2, which provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
1120
CIVIL PROCEDURE BY CONTRACT
out as an example of PLA that is the product of debate by a delib-
erative body, rather than the creation of judicial decision. Those
legislative debates included considerations of ensuring funda-
mental fairness for parties affected by arbitration clauses.218 As
discussed below, this was sought to be accomplished by limiting
the circumstances in which arbitration agreements could be util-
ized. One could hope that reviewing the use of the FAA might
shed light on how effectively legislation has been used as a
mechanism to ensure fairness in the use of PLAs. Unfortunately,
the subsequent seventy-plus years of arbitration clause enforce-
ment by the courts has only demonstrated that judicial embrace
of PLAs is so great that the courts have obliterated whatever re-
straints the legislature sought to impose.
Although the FAA was originally intended to be limited in
scope so as to recognize and enforce arbitration clauses only in
commercial situations where parties of equal bargaining power
make a knowing decision to utilize arbitration,219 the Supreme
Court has greatly extended the scope of the FAA far beyond the
original intent of Congress to the point where arbitration clauses
are recognized as valid and enforceable in almost every kind of
transaction.22 ° The experience of the FAA demonstrates that if
Congressional control is to be exercised, it must be done very
tightly.22' Furthermore, the experience of the FAA, when viewed
in conjunction with judicial recognition of forum selection clauses,
indicates that there is little hope of the courts imposing any kind
of limitations on the use of PLAs, especially limitations that could
be effective in preventing unfairness.
222
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2.
218. See infra Part VIII.A.1.
219. See Sternlight, supra note 125, at 647.
220. Id. at 660-66.
221. Id. at 705. Professor Sternlight argues that if the Court does not attain some bal-
ance between arbitration and litigation, Congress should step in to protect persons of
lesser bargaining power from unfair arbitration agreements. Id. at 711-12.
222. Id. at 687-88.
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Professor Jean Sternlight has traced the history of judicial in-
terpretation and application of the FAA.223 She identifies an ini-
tial "[p]eriod of [original [i]ntent" where the FAA was interpreted
as applying to situations of true voluntary consent between two
merchants of equal bargaining power.224 During this period, the
FAA was not thought to apply to a customer's securities fraud ac-
tion against a brokerage house because of a lack of knowledge on
the part of the customer. 2 5 The FAA was also inapplicable to a
discharged employee's action against his former employer.226 Pro-
fessor Sternlight states that "[allthough the Court did not explic-
itly reference a policy of protecting consumer choice, the Court
was concerned with protecting the employee from a result he had
not anticipated when signing the agreement."22 Thus, the FAA
was interpreted as limiting the situations to which it should ap-
ply, in part, to preserve some notion of fundamental fairness.
Current judicial interpretation of the FAA has evolved to the
point where arbitration is viewed by the Court as the equivalent
of litigation.22" This is evidenced by a judicial preference for arbi-
tration that has manifested itself in the notion that "any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in fa-
vor of arbitration."229 Additionally, as stated by Professor
Sternlight, "[tlhe Supreme Court dramatically increased the
scope of the FAA during this third period [1983 to present] by ex-
pounding the dual myths that the FAA applies to actions brought
in state court and that the FAA prohibits states from enacting
legislation hostile to arbitration."231
An extremely important question lies within Professor's Stern-
light's assertion: How was the Court able to increase the scope of
an act of Congress? Having created the recognition of forum
selection clauses, it makes some sense that the Court could
223. Id. at 644-74.
224. Id. at 647.
225. Id. at 648 (analyzing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 429, 435, 438 (1953)).
226. Id. at 648-49 (discussing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-
01, 205 (1956)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 672-73 (citing Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
229. Id. at 660 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983)).
230. Id. at 664.
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extend their enforcement to whatever situations it felt appropri-
ate. However, as seen with jury waivers, constitutional concerns
impose a limitation on the circumstances in which courts may
hold a waiver to be effective."' However, when the legislature has
acted and imposed some limitations on the situations in which
arbitration agreements may be enforced, how did the Court ex-
tend their usage beyond that which Congress authorized? Addi-
tionally, how did the Court extend the FAA into the states and
preempt any state action intended to limit the use of arbitration
agreements?
Nevertheless, arbitration clauses are most often enforced with
notions of fundamental fairness overlooked in favor of allowing
arbitration whenever possible. The protections for consumers en-
visioned to be within the original intent and the limitations on
the scope of the FAA have been brushed aside or expanded by ju-
dicial interpretation. The result is that while the courts can rely
on the Carnival Cruise Lines. 2 decision as the forum selection
clause high-water mark, allowing reliance upon a PLA without
regard for underlying fairness, the Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
233
decision can be used as such for arbitration clauses. In Hill, an
arbitration clause contained in paperwork shipped with a com-
puter was enforced even though the only way the consumers
could have avoided the agreement would have been to return
what had been paid for and delivered to their home.234 Conse-
quently, the protections for basic fairness that were envisioned in
the FAA in 1925 have now been swept away by judicial fiat.
While the authors agree with Professor Sternlight's analysis of
the history of the judicial treatment of the FAA, the authors
somewhat disagree with her conclusion as to what it all means.
She argues that congressional control of arbitration clauses may
be needed if the Supreme Court does not change its course con-
cerning its overwhelming preference for arbitration over litiga-
tion.235 She states, however, that "Congress need not enact its
231. See supra Part VI.A.2.
232. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991).
233. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
234. Id. at 1148; see also Jean IL Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Un-
fair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J. 8 (1997) (discussing the impact of Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc.).
235. See Sternlight, supra note 125, at 712.
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own laws directly regulating arbitration."236 Instead, she argues
that Congress "should simply restore to state legislatures and
courts their power to protect consumers and other little guys."2 37
The authors disagree for two reasons. First, experience with
judicial treatment of PLAs, whether forum selection clauses cre-
ated from court opinion or arbitration clauses authorized by stat-
ute, shows that judicial preference for them will never result in a
body of law that adequately ensures fundamental fairness.238 Sec-
ond, not only is it advisable for Congress to act, it is solely within
the authority of the legislature pursuant to Article III to regulate
PLAs as procedural mechanisms that regulate access to and aid
the functioning of the courts.2 39
2. Choice of Law Provisions: A More "Reasonable" Legislative
(Deliberative Body) Approach
Parties to a contract, by means of a choice of law provision,
may also designate the law to be applied to their contract in any
later dispute that may arise.24° These provisions are PLAs in the
sense that prior to any existent dispute, the parties are seeking to
order how the resolution of that dispute will take place.241 The
choice of law provisions are different than the other PLAs in that
what they seek to reorder is the source of substantive law under
which their agreement will be construed, rather than the proce-
dural system within which the dispute will be resolved. Forum se-
lection clauses determine venue and perhaps personal jurisdic-
tion. Jury waivers determine who shall be the trier of fact.
Arbitration agreements remove the dispute from the courts.
Accordingly, choice of law provisions do not seek to strategically
place one party at a procedural disadvantage. Additionally, be-
cause they address substantive law, choice of law provisions help
interpret the contract whether or not a later dispute is litigated.
Nevertheless, in this article, the authors have included choice of
law provisions as PLAs because they allow a party to gain an ad-
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See supra Part VI.AL.
239. See supra Part IV.A.
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 186-87 (1988).
241. See id.
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vantage by contractually designating a source of law and because
they provide that party with a substantive right that might not
otherwise be available. Given this potential for advantage, the
concerns for a party with less bargaining power, knowledge, or
meaningful choice are equivalent to those of parties to the other
PLAs previously discussed.
Choice of law PLAs are instructive to this discussion because
there is a body of law developed around provisions adopted by leg-
islatures or other deliberative bodies.242 The Uniform Commercial
Code (the "UCC") and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws (the "Restatement") each contain a provision that governs
when a choice of law should be given effect.243 Both provisions
seek to offer protection to less advantaged parties by restricting
the scope of what law may be contractually designated.2"
The UCC provides that if a transaction bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to more than one forum, the parties may contract as to
which law will apply.245 Similarly, the Restatement requires that
the contracted source of law have a "substantial relationship" to
the transaction.246 If the contracted choice of law does not meet
the substantial relationship test, there must be a "reasonable ba-
sis" for the choice. 247 Additionally, the contracted choice of law
cannot be "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determi-
nation of the particular issue."2' Therefore, the choice of law can-
not be unrelated to the suit.249 Furthermore, a contractual choice
of law cannot allow one party to accomplish, by means of a PLA,
that which would be prohibited by the substantive law. °
242. The Uniform Commercial Code, drafted by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has been adopted in some
form by all fifty states and the District of Columbia. See U.C.C., 1 U.L.A. XVI, 1-2 (1989 &
Supp. 2001). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is the product of the American
Law Institute.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988); U.C.C. § 1-105(1)
(1989 & Supp. 2001).
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988); U.C.C. § 1-105(1)
(1989 & Supp. 2001).
245. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1989 & Supp. 2001).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2)(a) (1988).
247. Id.
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This sense of restraint in both the UCC and the Restatement is
wholly lacking in the judicially created doctrine enforcing forum
selection clauses. The contractually designated forum need not
bear any relationship to the dispute at hand, but rather must not
be "so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he [the resisting
party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court."251' This provides little, if any, prohibition on what forum
may be designated. It was argued previously that a better ap-
proach to forum selection clauses would be to limit the forum that
the parties may designate by contract to those that applicable
venue statues would designate . 2 " By so doing, the concern for
procedural fairness that underlies the venue statutes would not
be subject to wholesale avoidance or alteration by the parties.2 13 It
is consideration and discussion of this type of issue that should
occur surrounding PLAs generally. It has been lacking from judi-
cial decisions that have embraced forum selection clauses largely
on an all or nothing basis.
Several states' legislative enactments give effect to choice of
law PLAs, but do so with an eye toward protecting consumers or
other potentially unwitting parties to a provision. 4 A common
formulation applies only to contracts in excess of a specified dol-
lar amount, frequently $250,000.25'5 Furthermore, contracts for
personal services are excluded. 256 This protective restraint in ap-
plication is similar to that which was originally intended by the
FAA.257 But as discussed previously, judicial decisions, for all
practical purposes, have eliminated the FAA's intended protec-
tion.258 Congress would serve potential parties to PLAs well by
determining their scope and applicability. As discussed, while
PLAs have their place, at the same time they can be used to gain
unfair advantage of one party over the other.
251. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972).
252. See Taylor, supra note 30, at 850-53 (arguing that the holding in Stewart Orga-
nazation, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), is the preferable approach for enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses).
253. Id. at 833.
254. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2001); N.Y GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-1401 (Consol. 2001).
255. See, e.g., 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2001).
256. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (Consol. 2001).
257. See infra Part VIII.A.1.
258. See supra Part VI.B.1.
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VII. SUPER CONTRACT
The question of PLA enforcement has been approached by the
courts largely as one of deference to private contractual auton-
omy. It is only when considering the jury waiver PLA, where
there is a constitutional dimension to the contractual waiver, that
courts inquire whether the waiver was "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent." Otherwise, in the context of the other PLAs, parties
are largely held to their bargain, and PLAs are enforced as a mat-
ter only of contract. Their effect on the underlying fairness of the
public procedural system is mostly ignored.2 59 But the contract
law applied to PLAs somehow becomes fundamentally different
than the law applied to the enforcement of "normal" contracts.
The approach taken by the courts has turned PLAs into a hybrid
form of "super contract."26 Traditional defenses to contract for-
mation afford little, if any, relief to a party seeking to avoid hav-
ing a PLA enforced.' Furthermore, once found to be valid, courts
in near knee-jerk fashion provide automatic specific performance
without acknowledging any necessity for first examining the pre-
requisites for specific performance or injunctive relief required for
a "normal" contract.262
A. Traditional Contract Defenses Fall by the Wayside
The Bremen standard for enforcement of forum selection PLAs
contains some restraints upon the circumstances in which PLAs
are given effect. PLAs are considered "invalid for such reasons as
fraud or overreaching"263 and must have been "freely negoti-
ated"2" by "experienced and sophisticated businessmen,"265 per-
sons at "arm's-length."266 Nevertheless, the Court's decision in
Carnival Cruise Lines seemed to brush aside many protections for
259. See supra Part VIAL.
260. See infra Part VII.C.
26L See infra Part VII.A.
262. See generally Graydon S. Sterling, Forgotten Equity: The Enforcement of Forum
Clauses, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 405 (1999) (discussing specific performance as the appro-
priate mechanism for enforcement of forum selection clauses); infra Part VII.B.
263. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
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consumers. For instance, a PLA on the back of a passenger ticket,
is "neither freely negotiated" nor the product of "arm's-length"
bargaining.267 The Court simply neglected to address either the
adhesive nature of the contract or any related contractual de-
fenses.268 In so doing, the Court opened the door for the use of
PLA adhesion contracts and closed the door to the defense of in-
validity for fraud or overreaching.269 The result is that PLAs are
almost automatically enforced, and defenses sounding of uncon-
scionability are fruitless.
In accord, the doctrine of separability makes asserting these
defenses to the contract nearly impossible. Traditional contract
law holds that if there is no contract, then there are no obliga-
tions or rights flowing from it. 271' Likewise, if one party can avoid
the legal relations created by the contract 2 2 and chooses to do so,
there are no obligations or rights flowing from the contract at
all.273 Whatever the agreement between the parties may have
been, there is no legally recognized duty to perform,274 and there-
fore, no contract. Corbin expressed this logic by stating:
267. The Ninth Circuit had previously refused to enforce the forum selection clause for
precisely these reasons. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 388-89 (9th
Cir. 1990).
268. See, e.g., Julie H. Burch, Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts: An Un-
conscionable Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, 23 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 329, 345-48
(1992) (discussing that the court in Carnival Cruise Lines "ignored the fundamental con-
cepts of unconscionability"); Mullenix, supra note 12, at 352-70 (criticizing the decision in
Carnival Cruise Lines for promoting the use of adhesion contracts in forum selection
PLAs).
269. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 14, at 71-72 (stating that the Carnival Cruise Lines
decision seriously erodes the standard for enforcement established in The Bremen); Lee
Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clause
in Consumer Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 707-14 (1992) (stating that Carnival
Cruise Lines burdens consumers by validating forum selection PLAs in almost all con-
sumer contracts).
270. See, e.g., Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301-02 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding that, since forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and that the party
seeking to avoid enforcement of a forum selection clause bears a heavy burden, a forum
selection clause contained in a fraudulently induced settlement agreement would be en-
forced because the fraud was not directed at the specific clause in question); see also Led-
erman, supra note 179, at 432 (stating that the application of the The Bremen test for en-
forcement of forum selection clauses almost always results in their enforcement);
Solimine, supra note 8, at 52 (discussing the judicial trend toward rejection of challenges
to forum selection clauses and their almost invariable enforcement).
271. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
272. Id. § 7.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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[Ilf the alleged defect exists, it affects the provision for arbitration
just as much as it affects the other provisions .... If one party failed
to express assent to the terms proposed by the other, no contract has
been made. The proposal for arbitration lacks acceptance just as
fully as do the other proposed terms.
275
Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that tradi-
tional contract defenses may be utilized to defeat PLAs.2 16 How-
ever comforting this sounds, the comfort is meaningless because
within the PLA jurisprudence is the doctrine of separability,
which renders traditional contract formation defenses virtually
meaningless.
The doctrine of separability was accepted by the Supreme
Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.,277 a case involving alleged fraudulent inducement of a con-
tract containing an arbitration clause.78 Separability is the con-
cept that PLAs are "separate" from the parent contracts of which
they are a part.2 79 The doctrine requires that a defense, such as
duress, unconscionability, or fraud, be directed at the particular
PLA clause itself.28 ° Thus, a claim of fraudulent inducement
which taints the entire contract is insufficient to halt the en-
forcement of a PLA."' The doctrine has also been applied to fo-
rum selection clauses. 2  Because the doctrine applies regardless
of the nature of the defense, a forum selection clause or arbitra-
tion clause must itself be fraudulent or unconscionable; 28 3 only
then will the PLA be unenforceable. The doctrine results in the
enforcement of the PLA, embedded in a contract which, as a
whole, is invalid due to fraud, duress, or unconscionability. 2' The
275. 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1444 (1951). This reasoning ap-
plies to other PLAs as vell.
276. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987).
277. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
278. Id. at 404.
279. See id. at 402.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974); J.B. Harris,
Inc. v. Razei Bar Indus. Ltd., 37 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Am. Life Ins. Co., v.
Parra, 25 F. Supp. 2d 467, 478 (D. Del. 1998). But see Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v.
Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that when an al-
leged contract is oral, existence of the contract should be determined prior to enforcement
of a forum selection clause).
283. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
284. See id.
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doctrine enforces these clauses before the contract's validity is de-
termined, and thus before it has been legally determined that a
binding PLA exists.285 In the case of arbitration clauses, the result
is that the dispute is removed from the courts where the defense
of invalidity would seem to have a better chance of success.
While PIA jurisprudence embraces the concept of separability,
traditional contract law has recognized the severability of clauses
in a contract. The doctrine of severability allows for enforcement
of valid contract provisions, despite the unenforceability or inva-
lidity of one or more sister provisions." 6 Nevertheless, the doc-
trine has some limitations. If public policy renders the provisions
unenforceable, the court, prior to "severing" the unenforceable
clause from the contract and enforcing the rest, must be assured
that the severed provision is not an essential part of the agreed
upon exchange2 87 and that the party seeking enforcement of the
rest of the contract did not engage in serious misconduct.2 8
While similar, the doctrine of severability highlights the defi-
ciencies of the paralleled separability concept as applied to
PLAs.289 Severability is concerned with a valid contract, a part of
which is not enforceable due to a defect in formation or matters of
public policy.29 ° Thus, where severability assumes that an other-
wise valid contract exists,29' separability disregards the factual
challenge to the invalidity of the contract as a whole by requiring
evidence that the fraud was directed at the particular provi-
sion."' Separability pares the PTA portion away from the con-
tract as a whole and enforces that portion prior to determining
whether the rest of the contract has validity in the face of an al-
leged defect. Therefore, any challenges the resisting party seeks
to raise concerning the formation of the contract become much
more difficult when directed at the PLA, for it must be the PLA
that is invalid not the contract as a whole.
285. See id.
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 183 (1979).




291. Id. The conclusion that there is a valid contract may result if the issue is not
raised by the parties or, if contested, because the court determines the issue before reach-
ing the severability determination. Id.
292. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
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An examination of the two concepts reveals that severability is
a process of analysis while separability is simply a rule of inter-
pretation.293 Severability is a process in which the court deter-
mines the validity of the contract and each of its provisions.294 If a
provision is sought to be severed, the court examines whether
that provision was an essential part of the agreed exchange be-
tween the parties295 and whether the party seeking enforcement
of the rest of the contract is one whom engaged in serious mis-
conduct.296 By definition, severability applies only when a con-
tract has both provisions that are void or voidable and that are
enforceable.297 If the contract fails as a whole because the provi-
sion was essential to the bargain or there was misconduct, sever-
ability will not occur.29 ' By contrast, separability is simply a rule
of interpretation because it contains no protection for the
wronged party. In fact, there is no freedom of the court to con-
sider the circumstances under which the parties contracted.
There is no consideration of whether a deceptive party has been
able to swindle an innocent party out of his day in court.299 Cer-
tainly, there is no determination of whether the PLA was an
essential part of the exchange. °0 While the process of severability
has limitations which ensure a fair application, the rule of sepa-
rability for PLAs has no such protection, and despite the Court's
oft-mentioned support for traditional state law defenses to
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (1979).
294. Id. § 183
295. Id. § 184(1).
296. Id. § 184(2).
297. Id. § 184(1).
298. Id.
299. This effect also gives rise to serious due process issues.
300. The proliferation of arbitration clauses is evidenced by the fact that they are in-
serted in most contracts. Most consumers and other contracting parties are not aware of
the presence of the clause. See Michael A. Hanzman, Arbitration Agreements: Analyzing
Threshold Choice of Law and Arbitrability Questions: An Often Overlooked Task, 70 FLA.
B.J. 14 (1996). Mr. Hanzman notes that "mandatory arbitration clauses are becoming
standard in many contracts, including agreements between customers and securities bro-
ker-dealers, franchisors and franchisees, employment contracts, insurance agreements,
construction contracts, and agreements betveen professional service providers and their
respective clients." Id. at 14. There is no bargaining, not even a mention as to its exis-
tence. Furthermore, given the Coures ruling in Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996), states are unable to ensure that contracting parties bargained at all. For an ex-
arpple of a case holding parties bound to an arbitration clause that they did not see until
the product arrived in the mail, see Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997); see also Sternlight, supra note 234, at 8.
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PLAs, ° ' the effect of separability renders these defenses
meaningless.
The Supreme Court held in Perry v. Thomas 2 that "[a] state-
law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the text of]
§ 2.13°" Thus, state law provisions that specifically address arbi-
tration clauses, such as requiring that they be in bold and larger
print than other provisions of the contract, 30 4 are pre-empted by
the FAA.305 This leaves state legislators and courts with general
contract defenses, as arbitration-neutral policies to defeat an ar-
bitration clause. Because general contract defenses do not target
the PLA, they are not pre-empted. °6 However, separability de-
mands enforcement when there is only a general contract de-
fense, rather than evidence that the arbitration provision itself
was the particular target of fraud. Thus, it renders any general
contract defense largely ineffective because the challenge to the
contract as a whole must be arbitrated.37 Thus, PLA enforcement
is automatic because separability prevents the legal examination
that general contract defenses are designed to address. The result
is an enforcement of the PLA prior to the determination that it is
valid and/or enforceable.
B. Unable To Be Breached and Always Specifically Enforced
With any contract, a party who feels that there is no benefit to
the bargain or that the cost of breaching the contract may be less
301. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 ("[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2."); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) ("[Sltate law,
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues con-
cerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.").
302. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
303. Id. at 492.
304. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684.
305. Id. at 687-88. "Montana's law places arbitration agreements in a class apart from
'any contract' and singularly limits their validity. The State's prescription is thus inconso-
nant with, and is therefore preempted by, the federal law." Id. at 688.
306. See id. at 687; Perry, 482 U.S. at 490.
307. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1966) (holding
that a claim of fraudulent inducement directed specifically at the arbitration provision
could be heard by the court prior to ordering arbitration, but a claim of fraudulent in-
ducement directed at the contract as a whole must proceed to the arbitrators, thus enforc-
ing the clause before its validity is determined).
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expensive than fulfilling it has the option to breach the contract
and pay damages."'8 It is an extraordinary remedy to order the
breaching party to specifically perform the obligations of the con-
tract. Moreover, courts only issue non-monetary damages for the
breach of the contract when there is no adequate remedy at
law." 9 Each situation has traditionally required an affirmative
showing that the underlying bargain was fundamentally fair,
just, and equitable. 10
Specific performance of agreements has traditionally been
within the equitable powers of courts. 1' Courts may look at the
totality of the circumstances between the parties when consider-
ing whether to order specific performance of a contract." 2 Addi-
tionally, specific performance will not be granted if "the contract
was induced by mistake or by unfair practices." 3 The court's dis-
cretion is so great that the Restatement's comment (a)31 4 men-
tions that courts may refuse specific performance "even though no
single legal doctrine alone would make the promise unenforce-
able."315 Thus, the fact that a provision is legally enforceable does
not control whether specific performance is ordered.316 The near
seemingly automatic and consistent enforcement of PLAs re-
moves this discretionary power from the courts by requiring the
mandatory enforcement of PLAs, regardless of the circumstances
of the case and irrespective of the intent of the parties.
The enforcement of PLAs has caused traditional notions of con-
tract law to be turned upside down. Courts cite with a near rever-
ential voice the sanctity of the right of private autonomy in enter-
308. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 235-236 (1979).
309. Id. § 359.
310. Id. § 358 (stating that specific performance will be ordered on such terms as jus-
tice requires); id. § 358 cmt. a ("'he objective of the court in granting equitable relief is to
do complete justice to the extent that this is feasible."); id. § 364 (stating that specific per-
formance will not be granted if doing so would be unfair because of mistake, misrepresen-
tation, or unreasonable hardship).
311. Id. ch. 16, Topic 3, introductory cmt. (recounting the history and discretionary na-
ture of specific enforcement); see also id. § 358 (giving guidance to attempt to effectuate
the purposes of the contract and justice); id. § 358 cmt. a (stating that the objective of a
court granting specific performance is to do "complete justice").
312. Id. § 358 cmt. a.
313. Id. § 364; see also id. § 364 cmt. a (explaining that courts sometimes may not allow
specific performance even though they might award damages).
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ing contracts by giving near automatic specific performance or in-
junctive relief in the face of a PLA. Once found to be valid, a fo-
rum selection clause will cause a suit to be dismissed or trans-
ferred to the contractually designated forum."' An arbitration
agreement will cause a party to be enjoined from pursuing its day
in court. Yet these enforcement remedies are not preceded by a
finding of either fundamental fairness in the bargain or lack of
adequate remedy at law."'8 Instead, the traditional burdens are
reversed.319 It is not the party seeking the enforcement of the con-
tract that holds the burden, as it is with specific performance. In-
stead, the enjoined party must prove fundamental unfairness of
the PLA itself in order to escape enforcement. ° This reversing of
traditional burdens results in near automatic enforcement of
PLAs. As will be discussed, because PLAs have the ability to re-
order the fundamental balance of the public system of dispute
resolution, an even higher level of fairness should be required to
be established prior to enforcement, not a lesser one.
C. Could There Be a Public Policy More Deserving of Insulation
From Contractual Modification?
In one sense, it is remarkable that PLAs have been afforded
the status of "super contract." They are contracts that operate
within the public system of dispute resolution, a system that ex-
ists to serve the fundamental societal purpose of peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes. In other areas where considerations of important
public or societal policy come into play, courts have given in-
creased scrutiny to the contract when considering enforcement.32'
Apt analogies can be drawn from cases involving pre-marital
agreements ("PMAs")322 and covenants not to compete ("NCAs"). 323
317. See supra Part VI.A.1.
318. See supra text accompanying note 218.
319. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing that, after The Bre-
men, a forum selection clause will be enforced unless the resisting party can show that en-
forcement would be unreasonable under the circumstances).
321. See, e.g., Advent Electronics, Inc. v. Buckman, 112 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that non-competition clauses must be analyzed by the courts to determine
whether they serve a legitimate business purpose).
322. Typically, a PMA determines the substantive resolution of issues or property dis-
tribution in the event of a dissolution of the marriage. See generally Brian Bix, Bargaining
in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think
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Each contract involves a situation where a party of lesser bar-
gaining power, the spouse-to-be with fewer assets, or the poten-
tial employee seeking a job, is presented with a contractual provi-
sion in a largely "take it or leave it" context by a party of greater
power. Each also may operate to alter and even lessen the weaker
party's substantive and/or procedural rights in the event a dis-
pute arises in the future.3 24 Admittedly, not all PLAs are drafted
from the context of parties of unequal bargaining power; true
arm's length agreements which were voluntarily entered into by
informed equals are not the problem. However, the fact that there
is a context in which they can be fairly utilized does not obviate
the great opportunity for fundamental unfairness in other con-
texts. Given the societal interest at stake in a public dispute reso-
lution system that is fundamentally fair, it would seem that PLAs
should be afforded heightened scrutiny rather than being
anointed as "super contracts" which are afforded little scrutiny.
For reasons of public policy, PMAs were largely considered un-
enforceable prior to 1970.325 While now gaining judicial accep-
tance, much greater scrutiny is given to formation of PMAs than
has been given to PLAs, especially the forum selection clause and
the arbitration agreement. Courts examine whether the agree-
ment was freely entered into by the parties with full knowledge of
the agreement 326 under circumstances that indicate good faith,327
and without duress or undue influence.328 Out of concern for fun-
damental fairness, commentators have suggested, and some
About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 145-62 (1998) (discussing the history and
enforceability of PMAs).
323. NCAs set limits upon a present employee's future activities after the termination
of the employee-employer relationship. See generally Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of
"Involuntary" Contracts: The Judicial Rewriting of Unreasonable Covenants Not to Com-
pete, 6 TEX. WEsLEYAN L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1999) (discussing covenants not to compete and
theories of enforceability).
324. See generally Bix, supra note 322.
325. See Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1970) (holding that PMAs are
contracts and will be upheld "if they are fair between the parties and fairly, freely, and
understandingly entered into").
326. See Bix, supra note 322, at 153-54 (indicating that the courts' tests for evaluating
PMAs inquire as to whether the parties had full disclosure and full knowledge of his or her
rights).
327. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (holding that PMAs
are contracts and should be evaluated under the same criteria).
328. See, e.g., Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Wis. 1986) (holding that a PMA
is valid if each spouse entered into it voluntarily, freely, and with adequate information
about their spouse's financial situation).
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courts have gone so far as to make, the PMA unenforceable un-
less the party forfeiting the party's rights had the opportunity to
consult with an attorney."9 The party must also have received
full disclosure of material circumstances that could effect the pro-
visions of the agreement.330 This stands in sharp contrast to the
willingness of courts to enforce forum selection clauses hidden on
the back of passenger ship tickets,33 ' or arbitration agreements
found inside the packaging of a newly purchased personal com-
puter.332
While NCAs also create equal concerns with formation is-
sues, 333 the basic questions for purposes of determining enforce-
ment inquire into the reasonableness of the terms of the agree-
ment.334 To address the issue, most states use the analysis found
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.335 This analysis looks to
whether the agreement is necessary to protect legitimate inter-
ests of the employer and whether the restriction protecting the
employer does so in a reasonable manner; considerations include
terms of length,336 type of activity restricted,3 ' and geographic
scope of the limitation.33' The employer's interests, however, must
329. See Bix, supra note 322, at 153 (noting that since courts were hesitant about en-
forcement of PMAs, to ensure procedural and substantive fairness the court would
strongly consider whether both parties consulted attorneys or at least had the opportunity
to do so).
330. See Button, 388 N.W.2d at 546.
331. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1986) (consid-
ering the reasonableness of factors such as a limited duration and the content of informa-
tion to be disclosed).
334. See generally John W. Bowers, Covenants Not to Compete: Their Use and Enforce-
ment in Indiana, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1996) (citing Donahue v. Permacel Tape
Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. 1955) (holding that in determining the validity of a negative
covenant in restraint of competition, the contract will be construed strictly against cove-
nantee and a test of validity is dependent not merely upon the covenant itself but upon the
entire contract and situation to which it is related)).
335. See generally Damren, supra note 323 (describing enforceable contracts as a sub-
set of mutual agreements and subsequently a majority of jurisdictions eliminate or void
restrictive covenants that contain unreasonable restrictions).
336. See, e.g., Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ind.
1986) (finding a covenant not to compete unenforceable because it did not include a tempo-
ral restriction).
337. See, e.g., Weseley Software Dev. Corp. v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp 137, 144 (D. Conn.
1997) (outlining the "factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a re-
stricting covenant not to compete").
338. See, e.g., House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21, 24-25 (Ill. 1967) (finding
void an agreement that prohibited the employee from engaging in same or similar busi-
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be reasonably balanced against the hardship imposed upon the
employee.
3 39
This type of analysis is almost wholly absent from the PLA
analysis. When the merits of enforcement are examined, forum
selection clauses are refused enforcement only if the designated
forum is "so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he [the resist-
ing party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court."340 The analysis of PLAs has not been focused on balancing
the reasonableness of the contracting parties' competing inter-
ests. Rather, it has focused on the presumption of enforcement, a
task that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a resisting
party to overcome.
One could argue that the difference in approach is justifiable
because PLAs deal with procedural rights, while PMAs and re-
strictive covenants serve to limit substantive rights. However,
that argument undervalues the importance of procedural rights,
and PLAs can render the substantive right beyond the reach of
the party who has been denied his or her day in a judicial tribu-
nal or relegated to a far away forum. Thus, PLAs deserve the
same degree of scrutiny as pre-dispute contractual provisions
seeking to define substantive rights.
VIII. THE NEED FOR REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
"It seems to me that judges who have let their concern for their
own crowded docket overcome their concern for the rights they are
entrusted with should step aside and let someone else assume their
burdens."4'
With the exception of the arbitration clause, the question of
when to enforce PLAs is a confused muddle of mostly judge-
ness as employer anywhere within a radius of thirty miles from any office of the employer
because the terms were considered unreasonable).
339. See, e.g., McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1311 (IlI. App. Ct. 1985)
(using a test which asks "whether the covenant is reasonably necessary to protect the in-
terests of the employer" while considering the hardship imposed upon the employee);
Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (list-
ing factors to be considered in determining whether a non-competition agreement is valid).
340. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972); see also supra notes
55-59 and accompanying text.
341. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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created law. 42 The forum selection clause was given life by a judi-
cial about-face as to the ability of parties to contractually alter
the system of procedure, especially in regard to removing a dis-
pute from an otherwise appropriate court.343 Also, the arbitration
clause, once prohibited by the same reasoning that refused to rec-
ognize forum selection clauses, was given legitimacy by legislative
action.3 However, the courts have extended the application of
arbitration agreements far beyond anything arguably ever in-
tended by Congress.345 Taken together, both of these PLAs dem-
onstrate a judicially created convolution of private contract and
public procedure that has been unable to appropriately balance
these two competing interests. The convolution claims to give def-
erence to the right of parties to enter contracts but, in reality, has
created a "super contract" that supersedes the interests of fair-
ness that should be at the heart of a public system of dispute
resolution. Because the courts have failed to construct a workable
framework for recognition and enforcement of PLAs, one can only
look to the legislature to provide a framework for enforcement
which ensures fundamental fairness. It is not only appropriate
that Congress act in this area, but only Congress has the power to
act.346 It is Congress that possesses the power under Article III to
establish the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts.347 It should
not be left to the courts to establish their own jurisdiction. While
Congress may delegate, and has delegated to the court the power
to establish rules of procedure by rulemaking, those powers not
delegated to the courts are reserved by Congress.3 4 8 Looking at
the arbitration clause as an example, the intention of Congress to
act pursuant to its Article III power is obvious from a reading of
the legislative history.349 Congress should again act pursuant to
its Article III power to address and resolve the difficulties that
surround PLAs, but unlike the FAA,350 all appropriate issues need
342. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Part III.
344. See supra Part III.B.1.
345. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial extension
of the appropriate use of the arbitration PLA).
346. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
347. See id.
348. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
349. See infra note 359.
350. See supra note 217.
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be addressed in a manner which does not allow the courts suffi-
cient wiggle-room to recreate this convoluted mess.
To the extent that PLAs operate to remove a category of cases
from the federal courts altogether, as with arbitration clauses, or
from any court other than the specifically designated one, as with
forum selection clauses, it is arguable that only Congress, pursu-
ant to its Article III power, possesses the constitutional authority
to act.3 51 Further, when a PLA operates to reorder an aspect of
procedure, such as altering rules of evidence or limiting discov-
ery, it is within the sole province of Congress to act, except to the
extent that Congress has delegated rule-making power to the Su-
preme Court.3 2 However, even then, the Court should only en-
gage in its deliberative rule-making function, and not redefine the
procedural system by judicial decision. 3
Since Congress has acted to provide for the recognition and en-
forcement of PLAs only in the area of arbitration, an examination
of the FAA as to the appropriate relative roles of courts and Con-
gress in recognizing and enforcing PLAs would be valuable. Un-
fortunately, such is not the case; all that is revealed by an exami-
nation of the FAA jurisprudence is a judicial rush to embrace
arbitration clauses which has caused the Court to ignore, if not
purposefully contort, the legislative history of the FAA. Most re-
cently, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,354 the United States
Supreme Court held that employment contracts, except those
specifically exempted in section 1 of the Act, are entitled to en-
forcement of an arbitration provisionY.35  The Court's opinion is
grounded in a discussion of how the FAA derives its power from
the Commerce Clause, 56 and this serves as a prime example of
how the Court has continued its misinterpretation, misapplica-
tion, and contortion of the Act.
The origins of the Court's misunderstanding can be traced pri-
marily to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.35 In Prima Paint, the Court held that Congress was acting
35. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
355. Id. at 119.
356. See id. at 115-19.
357. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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pursuant to its Commerce Clause power when it enacted the
FAA.35 ' This ruling directly contradicts oft-repeated explicit
statements in the legislative history.359 Nevertheless, the decision
has formed the foundation upon which most of the Supreme
Court's subsequent FAA jurisprudence is based. Therefore, the
opportunity to gain insight into the proper roles of the courts and
Congress, in recognizing and enforcing PLAs, has been lost. Addi-
tionally, the jurisprudence surrounding the FAA demonstrates
how the courts, when left to their own devices, have contorted a
legislative enactment far beyond what its drafters intended.60
The need for new legislative control is thereby at least demon-
strated, if not commanded.
A. The FAA: Congress Acting Pursuant to Article III Power
In Prima Paint, the United States Supreme Court held that the
FAA was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause,36' citing to legislative history to support their deci-
362sion. However, the Court misinterpreted critical passages of thehistory and outright misstated others.363
Prima Paint involved a claim of fraudulent inducement of a
contract for the purchase of a paint business. 3' The Court held
that "in passing upon a section 3 application for a stay while the
parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relat-
ing to the making and performance of the agreement to arbi-
358. Id. at 406-07.
359. See, e.g., Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judicia-y, 68th Cong. (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings]; Hearings on S.
4213 before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1923) [here-
inafter Senate Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-536 (1924); Julius
Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265
(1926). The New York statute and the federal Act were very similar and were both written
by Mr. Cohen. Cohen had help from commercial entities who also contemplated, sup-
ported, and presented the FAA, such as: The Committee on Commerce, Trade and Com-
mercial Law of the American Bar Association, and The Chamber of Commerce of the State
of New York, as well as "numerous other chambers and trade organizations." See Senate
Hearings, supra, at 2.
360. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406-07; see also infra Part VIII.A.1.
361. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
362. Id. at 405 n.13.
363. See infra notes 384-404 and accompanying text.
364. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 396-97.
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trate."365 Thus, the Court held that arbitration clauses were
"separable" from the parent contract, and evidence of fraud in the
inducement had to be directed at the arbitration clause itself
rather than at the entire agreement between the parties. 66 The
Court's decision that separability of the arbitration clause from
the parent contract emanated from the Act, combined with the
decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,367 which ef-
fectively held that the Act was substantive,368 raised the following
Erie question: could federal courts apply separability in a suit
where jurisdiction was based upon the diversity of the parties? 369
Rather than address the Erie substance versus procedure ques-
tion, the Court explicitly dismissed it, creating the fallacy that it
was "clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is
based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations
of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' 37 0 This
characterization avoided the Erie issue, because "Congress may
prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with re-
spect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to
365. Id. at 404. In so doing, the Court "honor[ed] ... the unmistakably clear congres-
sional purpose" that arbitration, once agreed upon by the parties, be speedy and efficient.
Id.
366. Id. For a discussion of the doctrine of separability as applied by the courts to
PLAs, see supra note 277-85 and accompanying text. In addition to the previously dis-
cussed difficulties, separability also cannot be squared with the legislative history. See
Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 17. The following was a conversation between Senator
Thomas Sterling, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee, and Mr. Cohen:
Mr. Cohen: [T]he question whether you waive it or not depends on whether
that is your signature to the paper, or whether you authorized that signature,
or whether the paper is a valid paper or not, whether it was delivered prop-
erly. So there is a question there which you have not waived the right of trial
by jury on.




367. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
368. Id. at 205. Although the case did not explicitly hold that the FAA was substantive,
the analysis the Court undertook, as well as the effect of its holding, rendered it so. James
F. Nooney, Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. REV. 607, 608
(1967) ("[Ilt was not, however, until the decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Amer-
ica in 1956 that the Supreme Court finally directed that arbitration was to be character-
ized as substantive in federal court diversity cases."); see also Linda R. Hirshman, The
Second Arbitration Trilogy: the Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305,
1320 (1985).
369. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 396.
370. Id. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924)).
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legislate."371 Thus, the Prima Paint holding was secured, and no
constitutional question arose because the Act was considered fed-
eral substantive law.372 Justice Fortas, writing for the majority,
relied on legislative history for that holding.373 However, the
Court disregarded the vision apparent from a plain reading of the
history and instead relied on excerpts that supported a vision of
its own.374
While it is true that arbitration affects the outcome of cases in
a manner sufficient to raise Erie concerns, the legislative history
speaks clearly that the Act was not intended as a substantive
measure, but rather a procedural one. 5 The Court's holding can-
not be reconciled with the brief in support of the Act which was
submitted to the joint committees. The brief states that the stat-
ute is not the source of arbitration clauses as a matter of substan-
tive law.376 This brief also indicates "[that the enforcement of ar-
bitration contracts is within the law of procedure, as dis-
tinguished from substantive law, is well settled"317 since "[a]n
agreement that all differences arising under a contract shall be
submitted to arbitration relates to the law of remedies, and the
law that governs remedies is the law of the forum."37" Addition-
371. Id.
372. The Act would eventually be held to vitiate state law based upon this holding. See
infra note 381.
373. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)); id. at 405
n.13 (citing to various individual points in the history). For further discussion, see infra
notes 380-404 and accompanying text.
374. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 408 (Black, J., dissenting); infra notes 380-404 and
accompanying text.
375. See infra notes 380-404 and accompanying text. We do not assert that the Act is
not capable of being passed pursuant to the commerce power, but rather than it was not,
in fact, passed under that authority. Simply because Congress may have powers via the
Commerce Clause to enact this legislation, does not provide conclusive evidence that it
was, in fact, passed pursuant to that power. The legislative history is the logical source for
what, in fact, Congress intended its authority to vest from. See id.; Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 26 n.11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court's desire to avoid the con-
stitutional problem that would arise from acknowledgment of this fact is understandable.
However, it is debatable whether the damage caused by its improper characterization, as
borne out in later decisions, is less than that which would have followed from the correct
characterization of the Act as procedural, even if it meant, at worst, that the Act was un-
constitutional.
376. See Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 38; see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note
359, at 276.
377. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 37 (citations omitted).
378. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Jamestown F. & C. R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1914));
see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 359, at 279 ("[Alrbitration under the Federal and
similar statutes is simply a new procedural remedy.").
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ally, Senator Graham testified that "[ilt does not involve any new
principle of law... [ilt creates no new legislation, grants no new
rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial
contracts and in admiralty contracts.""9 Thus, both Congress and
proponents of the Act declared it to be merely a form of remedy,
which falls squarely in the realm of procedural, rather than sub-
stantive, law.
The problematic holding in Prima Paint has been the founda-
tion for subsequent decisions which have held that the Act was
not only an exercise of the commerce power, but was an exercise
of that power to its fullest extent.3 ° This reasoning eventually
gave the Act the power to: (1) lre-empt state law;.. (2) apply to
unwitting consumers; 8 2 and most recently, (3) apply to all em-
ployees except those involved in commerce.38 3 Each of these deci-
sions assumes, and is premised upon, the passage of the Act by
Congress's exercise of its commerce power. However, if, contrary
to the finding of the Supreme Court in Prima Paint, the Act was
passed pursuant to Congress's Article III control over courts, the
commerce language in § 1 would then merely identify the target
of the legislation, rather than compel arbitration upon the unwill-
ing as a rule of law. What is most astonishing is that the legisla-
tive history of the Act is not ambiguous on this point. Overwhelm-
ingly, it is clear that the Act was procedural, rather than
substantive, and passed via Article III rather than pursuant to
the commerce power. Thus, the Court's holding in Prima Paint is
directly contradictory to the legislative history.
The Court's assertion in Prima Paint that "it is clear beyond
dispute"38 that the Act was passed pursuant to the commerce
power is a gross overstatement. Justice Fortas cited to both the
Senate and House Reports for support of this proposition.385 How-
ever, the only reference to interstate commerce that can be found
in the Senate Report merely reiterates those areas that the bill
relates to, which includes "contracts in interstate and foreign
379. 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924).
380. See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271, 275 (1995).
381. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
382. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997).
383. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
384. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
385. Id.
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commerce." 86 The House Report does mention the commerce
power,387 but this language is preceded in the paragraph by the
following:
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an
agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding
is brought and not one of substantive law to be determined by the
law of the forum in which the contract is made. Before such contracts
could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is essen-
tial.
3 88
The Court also cited to various places in the legislative his-
tory,389 but this support is equally unpersuasive, as each cite
merely reiterates that the targets of the Act were those contracts
involving transactions in interstate commerce.3 10 Most appall-
ingly, in its zeal to base the Act on the commerce power, the
Court stated that a "jurisdictional base broader than the com-
merce and admiralty powers" was urged in the brief submitted by
Mr. Cohen, but that there was "no indication in the statute or in
the legislative history that this invitation to go beyond those
powers was accepted, and [that] his own testimony took a much
narrower tack."39' This statement is the only clear assertion that
the legislative history supports the conclusion that the Act was
passed pursuant to the commerce power.392 However, this state-
ment is completely erroneous. The section in the brief entitled
386. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) ("The bill, while relating to maritime transactions
and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce, follows the lines of the New York ar-
bitration law enacted in 1920.").
387. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) ("The remedy is founded also upon the Federal
control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.").
388. Id.
389. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 n.13.
390. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (noting that the Act should relate to
'maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce, [and that it]
follows the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920"); 65 CONG. REC. 1931
(1924) (stating that the Act "only affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and con-
tracts in admiralty"); Senate Hearings, supra note 359, at 2 (stating that the Act "follows
the lines of the New York arbitration law, applying it to the fields wherein there is Federal
jurisdiction" and observing that "[tihese fields are in admiralty and in foreign and inter-
state commerce"); Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 7; id. at 16, 27-28 (noting Mr. Cohen
and Mr. Rose's statements that the promulgation of arbitration was intended to cover
three steps: state statutes, federal statute for federal jurisdiction, and treaties for foreign
countries)).
391. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 n.13.
392. Id.
1144
20021 CIVIL PROCEDURE BY CONTRACT 1145
"Legal Justification" did far more than "urge" a base broader than
the commerce power.393 Rather, it suggested that the commerce
power might be a legitimate source of authority,394 but explicitly
concluded that the sole power was Article III:
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its validity
upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers
of Congress. This is not the fact.
The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the [flederal courts
for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the con-
stitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish
and control inferior [flederal courts. So far as congressional acts re-
late to the procedure in the [flederal courts, they are clearly within
the congressional power. This principle is so evident and so firmly
established that it can not be seriously disputed.
A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments does relate solely to procedure of the [flederal courts ....
IWihether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a
question of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of the
jurisdiction wherein the remedy is sought.395
In fact, despite the suggestion that the commerce power might
be a legitimate source of authority, the brief closes the section
with the following:
Even if, however, it should be held that Congress has no power to de-
clare generally that in all contracts relating to interstate commerce
393. See Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 38.
394. The brief stated that:
[iut seems probable, however, that Congress has ample power to declare that
all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce or admiralty
transactions shall be recognized as valid and enforcible [sic] even by the state
courts. In both cases, the federal power is supreme. Congress may act at its
will, and having acted, no law or regulation of a state inconsistent with the
congressional act can be given any force or effect even in the courts of the
state itself. They are as much bound to carry out the provisions of such a
Federal statute as though it was an act of their own legislature.
The only questions which apparently can be raised in this connection are
whether the failure to enforce an agreement for arbitration imposes such a
direct burden upon interstate commerce as seriously to hamper it or whether
the enforcement of such a clause is of material benefit. If either of these ques-
tions can be answered in the affirmative, we believe it to be beyond question
that Congress can legislate concerning the matter.
Id.
395. Id. at 37.
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arbitration agreements shall be valid, the present statute is not ma-
terially affected. The primary purpose of the statute is to make en-
forcible [sic] in the [flederal courts such agreements for arbitration,
and for this purpose Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe
the jurisdiction and duties of the [flederal courts.3 9P
Thus, the Court's reading of the brief was faulty in that it ignored
the clear message that the primary source of authority was Arti-
cle III rather than the Commerce Clause.
Regarding Mr. Cohen's testimony, there is no explicit indica-
tion as to what Congress perceived as the authority for the Act,
since the only explicit conversation on the subject questioned
whether the jurisdiction was "ample" rather than on what juris-
diction was based.397 However, the last statement made to Con-
gress prior to its determination that it was authorized to pass the
Act was the following statement by Cohen to the Joint Commit-
tee:
But it can not be done under our constitutional form of government
and cover the great fields of commerce until you gentlemen do it, in
the exercise of your power to confer jurisdiction on the [flederal
courts. The theory on which you do this is that you have the right to
tell the [flederal courts how to proceed. And you say to the judge,
"You used to hold that these things were not good; now they are
good. You used to say you did not have jurisdiction; now you have ju-
risdiction." That is all there is to it.
398
Thus, the statements made and papers delivered to the con-
gressmen explicitly and unquestioningly stated that Article III
was the source of authority for the Act.
Further, in a strongly worded dissent, Justice Black described
the Prima Paint holding as "judicial legislation"' and convinc-
ingly used passages from the legislative history which contra-
396. Id. at 38; see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 359, at 277-78.
397. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 24. The hearings contained the following dis-
cussion:
Representative Dyer: There is no question of the authority of Congress to leg-
islate on this subject as provided in the bill, is there?
The Chairman: I do not think there is.
Representative Dyer: The authority and jurisdiction is ample?
The Chairman: Yes.
Id.
398. Id. at 17.
399. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting).
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dicted the Court's reasoning. °° However, the majority disre-
garded his assertions.4"' In so doing, the Court modified the Act
from its original purpose. This decision formed a false foundation
upon which all future arbitration jurisprudence would rest, a
foundation based on nothing more than the mere mention of pos-
sible commerce power, language identifying the target of the
Act,40 2 history,0 3 and an erroneous characterization of Mr.
Cohen's testimony and brief.40 4
B. The Court's Embrace of Arbitration Agreements Has Expanded
the FAA Beyond Congressional Intention
The Court has caused great confusion with its decision in
Prima Paint by choosing to ignore the FAA legislative history in-
dicating the reliance of Congress upon Article III power, and in-
stead holding that the FAA was intended to be an act of national
substantive law that pre-empts state action in the area and that
avoids the Erie doctrine problems that would arise if the FAA
were considered to be a matter of procedure. By so doing, the
Court has greatly facilitated the judicial embrace of PLAs, to the
end that state attempts to restrict the use of arbitration clauses
have been nullified and the removal of cases from the jurisdiction
of the federal courts in favor of arbitration, has greatly expanded.
The effect is that courts are defining which cases they should
hear when it is Congress who not only should be the body to act
in this area, but has, in fact, acted. The separation of powers
problem is thus squarely faced.
1. Expanding to Whom the Act Applies
As a measure of federal substantive law, which negates any at-
tempts by states to regulate arbitration clauses, the Act has pro-
liferated the use of arbitration agreements tenfold.0 5 It was noted
that "[m]andatory arbitration clauses are becoming standard in
400. Id. at 413.
401. See id. at 401 n.7.
402. See supra note 390.
403. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 38.
404. See supra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., Hanzman, supra note 300, at 16.
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many contracts, including agreements between customers and se-
curities brokers-dealers, franchisors and franchisees, employment
contracts, insurance agreements, construction contracts, and
agreements between professional service providers and their re-
spective clients."4 6 Such agreements are also enforceable against
consumers, 407 even without notice that the agreement provides for
arbitration when products are purchased through the mail or
over the phone.408
Examination of the legislative history leaves little doubt that
this expansion of arbitration clauses was not contemplated by
Congress. The legislative history is inundated with references to
businessmen or merchants.4 9 The following are but a few exam-
406. See id. at 14.
407. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
408. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
409. The Senate Hearings contain a reference to 'merchants' or 'commercial activity' on
almost every page. Senate Hearings, supra note 359, at 1 (alluding to activity conducted
"as a merchant"); id. (noting that a committee handled "the many commercial disputes,
cases and cancellations by United States merchants"); id. at 2 ("[Tjhe merchants were sat-
isfied with the manner in which the matters were disposed of."); id. (questioning whether
"any questions were asked me as a merchant"); id. at 3 (noting the appeal to keep con-
sumer costs down, because merchants, when figuring costs, add to the price a certain
amount that represents the risk of disputes); id. ("Arbitration is the time-honored method
for the disposition of all business disputes and controversies."); id. (alluding to "the mer-
chants standpoint"); id. at 4 ("A merchant can not depend on it."); id. at 5 (noting that "the
merchants find that arbitration is very direct"); id. at 5-6 (referring to "trade disputes");
id. at 7 (giving an example of a successful resolution by arbitration, where the parties
were merchants); id. at 8 (referring to an example given where a person "buys a certain
class of goods for 50 cents a hundred"); id. at 9 ("It is purely an act to give the merchants
the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing."); id. at 10 ("[I]t is the primary end
of this contract that it is a contract between merchants with one another, buying and sell-
ing goods."); see also Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 6 (referring to "[tihe difficulties
merchants then met with"); id. ("The most unprofitable thing that the merchant and busi-
ness man, or anyone engaged in buying and selling, can confront him, is that of litiga-
tion."); id. at 7 ("There are four methods based on long experience I have had by which to
meet trade disputes, the ordinary everyday trade disputes, and it is for them that this leg-
islation is proposed."); id. ("Speaking for those engaged in buying and selling merchandise,
what is usually called trading.... It applies to all of them."); id. ("Speaking for those who
have had experience and who are engaged in business .... It preserves business friend-
ships ... . It raises business standards. It maintains business honor."); id. at 8 ("[Bly
which I mean our merchants were satisfied."); id. at 16 ("[Wlhy are these merchants and
these fruit shippers and those who are represented here, why are they for this?"); id. at 29
(explaining that trade organizations have an interest in developing customs"); id. (provid-
ing an example of a successful resolution where both parties were merchants); id. at 40
("An agreement for arbitration is in its essence a business contract."); see also 64 CONG.
REC. 1931, 1 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("This bill provides that where there are commercial contracts
and there is a disagreement.").
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ples of comments made by the drafters and proponents of the
FAA:
"It is purely an [A]ct to give the merchants the right or privi-
lege of sitting down and agreeing .... 410
"[1It is the primary end of this contract that it is a contract be-
tween merchants one with another, buying and selling goods."41'
"[Tihe ordinary every day trade disputes, and it is for them
that this legislation is proposed."4"2
"[O]ne of the trade customs that has been established, one of
the rules of the trade is that if you belong to a trade you shall ar-
bitrate your differences with them. The effect is that if you are a
member you arbitrate your differences, and if you are outside you
are not bound by it."
413
The repeated use of the term "merchant" in the legislative his-
tory strongly suggests that expansion outside the class of mer-
chants was not foreseen. In fact, the only organizations that testi-
fied before Congress were commercial and trade organizations.414
Despite the legislative history, courts have routinely seen fit to
apply the Act to consumers and employees, most recently in Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.415
It is one thing for arbitration clauses to be enforced between
parties of relatively equal bargaining power, who directly benefit
by the reduction in delay, cost, and amount of technicalities,
which results in a benefit to the business relationship. It is quite
another for an arbitration clause to bar from court a party who
merely purchased a single product or gained employment and
was unaware of the ramifications of an arbitration clause. These
410. Senate Hearings, supra note 359, at 9.
41L Id. at 10.
412. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 7.
413. Id. at 29.
414. See generally Joint Hearings, supra note 359. There were representatives from the
following associations and trade organizations: The American Farm Bureau Federation,
National League of Marine Merchants of the United States, The Western Fruit Jobbers
Association of America, The International Apple Shippers Association of America, The
Canner's League of California, American Fruit Growers, Inc. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
National Retail Lumber Dealer's Association, American Banker's Association, and Ameri-
can Manufacturer's Export Association of New York.
415. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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people are often less sophisticated and may be faced with the
choice of signing the agreement or foregoing the benefit. These
are also the people most disadvantaged by the Court's application
of its pro-arbitration policy, which disregards those parts of the
Act's history which plainly protect them.
Section 1 of the FAA exempts "seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce."41 This was the language at issue in Circuit City.417 All
but one lower court interpreted this phrase as exempting only
those employees who directly worked in interstate commerce. 41
8
However, the Ninth Circuit alone held that all employment
agreements were outside the embrace of the FAA,4"9 the decision
reversed by the United States Supreme Court.42 °
Circuit City involved an employment application containing an
arbitration clause."' After two years of employment, Adams filed
an employment discrimination lawsuit in state court.422 In re-
sponse, Circuit City filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the
state action and compel arbitration in accordance with the
FAA.4
23
In its opinion, the Court failed to address the distinction be-
tween the application for employment before it and the "contract
of employment" of which the Act speaks. 4 Similarly, the Court
dismissed the notion that the contract at issue was not a "con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce," to
which the FAA applies.425 The Court reasoned that if all contracts
of employment were beyond the reach of the Act, then exemption
for transportation employees would be "pointless." 426 As a result,
the Court held that unlike other portions of the Act, the exemp-
tion language should not be given a broad interpretation.4 2 ' The
416. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).




421. See id. at 109-10.
422. Id. at 110.
423. Id.
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Court chose to construe the exemption language in "a manner
consistent with the FAA's purpose."4 28 Congress's purpose was
merely to place arbitration clauses "on the same footing as other
contracts,"4 29 but the Court's purpose, as borne out by its deci-
sions, was to favor arbitration clauses. ° Most interestingly, the
Court explicitly declined to consult the legislative history sur-
rounding the exclusionary phrase, but noted that the record was
"quite sparse." 3'
Given the Court's refusal to revisit the legislative history, it is
not surprising that its opinion adds to the misapplication of the
Act, creating the situation where
[t]hose employment contracts most involving interstate commerce,
and thus most assuredly within the Commerce Clause power in
1925... are excluded from [the] Act's coverage; while those employ-
ment contracts having a less direct and less certain connection to in-
terstate commerce... would come within the Act's affirmative cov-
erage and would not be excluded. 4 2
The Court dismissed this inconsistency by asserting that several
statutes existed at the time and more would be passed which
were designed to handle disputes involving these classes of work-
ers.4 13 Therefore, the Court opined, Congress simply could have
chosen to remove those classes of employees and situations be-
cause statutes already applied to them.434
The Court also dismissed assertions of twenty-two state Attor-
ney Generals that the decision would intrude upon the ability of
the states to regulate the employment relationship.4 5 The Court
correctly characterized that assertion as being directed at South-
land Corp. v. Keating, rather than the decision at hand.4 36 Noting
that they had previously declined to overrule Southland in Allied-
Bruce,437 and that Congress had failed to act after either deci-
428. Id. at 118.
429. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
430. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
43L Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
432. Id. at 120 (citing to Brief for Respondent, page 38) (alteration in original).
433. Id. at 121.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 121-22.
436. Id. at 122 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
437. Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)).
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sion,43 the Court felt assured that its decision was the correct
one. 439
Among the troublesome aspects in Circuit City lies the premise
upon which it and most other arbitration jurisprudence is
based-namely, that the Act was a substantive measure passed
pursuant to the Commerce Clause." ° Much of the Court's opinion
is largely superfluous when the Act is correctly viewed as an Arti-
cle III measure, and the "commerce" language so revered by the
Court is removed from its pillar and given its proper role as
merely the means to identify the target of the legislation. When
viewed as such, the exemption language of section one is easily
interpreted. The Act, a procedural measure designed to target
commercial and trade contracts in interstate commerce, did not
involve the everyday employment contract." 1 Thus, Congress
chose to protect employees engaged in interstate commerce from
overzealous enforcement of the Act not because they were the
only employees to receive such protection, but rather because
Congress feared that their involvement with interstate commerce
might cause them to be targeted for enforcement." 2 The Act was
presented to the Senate a year prior to its passage," 3 and such a
conclusion can be gathered from reading the legislative history.
During the hearings, an objection was raised by the head of a la-
bor union.' In response, the Senators were explicitly told by the
Act's proponent:
[I]t was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitra-
tion in any sense .... if your honorable committee should feel that
there is any danger of that, they should add to the bill the following
language, "but nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or
any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce." It is not in-
438. Id.
439. Id. at 122-23. However, there is currently before the Senate a bill that would
amend the FAA to include the following: 'This chapter shall not apply with respect to a
claim of unlawful discrimination in employment if such claim arises from discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability." Civil Rights Proce-
dures Protection Act of 2001, S.163, 107th Cong. § 9 (2001).
440. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
441. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Dispute Resolution Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act: A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 1007, nn.456-57 (1996).
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tended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It
is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages
are, if they want to do it. Now, that is all there is in this.
4 4 5
Further, senators were concerned with the non-voluntary na-
ture of "take it or leave it" contracts, 6 such as those involving
employment and consumers. One Senator stated:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts
that are entered into are really not voluntary things at all. Take an
insurance policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can
leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either you can
make that contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same
with a good many contracts of employment. A man says "These are
our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is nothing for the
man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have
his case tried before the court, and has to have it tried before a tri-
bunal in which he has no confidence at all. 4
This same concern was expressed for insurance, freight, and
railroad consumers.' To alleviate the concerns of the congress-
men, they were told: "I think that ought to be protested against,
because it is the primary end of this contract that it is a contract
between merchants one with another, buying and selling
goods."" 9 Accordingly, when the bill was re-introduced in 1924,
the language exempting employees of interstate commerce had
been added.45° It is readily apparent from these selections that
the extension of the Act to areas of consumer and employee con-
tracts was contemplated, considered unacceptable, and the bill
was appropriately amended. Thus, the Act was to apply only to
those who were directly involved in the business of commercial
transactions.
Advocates of the Court's decisions assert that state law still ex-
ists to protect consumers and employees. However, under South-
land,45' and now Circuit City, these attempts to protect employees
445. Id. (statement of Mr. Platt, chairman of the Committee of Commerce, Trade, and
Commercial Law of the American Bar Association).
446. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 15; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 359, at
9-10.
447. Senate Hearings, supra note 359, at 9 (statement of Senator Walsh from Mon-
tana).
448. Id. at 10.
449. Id.
450. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
451. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that a California statute that limited the effect of arbi-
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will conflict with the FAA and be held to violate the Supremacy
Clause.452 Further, several employee-protective federal statutory
schemes enacted subsequent to the passage of the FAA are also
likely to be rendered meaningless.
2. State Pre-emption
If the FAA was passed pursuant to Article III and largely in-
tended as a procedural measure, neither the issues of pre-
emption nor the Act's application in state court proceedings come
into play. However, given the Court's mischaracterization of the
Act,453 subsequent courts have faced such issues.454 Although sev-
eral cases chipped away at the original purposes and limits of the
Act,4 55 Southland was the bludgeon by which the Frankenstein-
like creation was forced upon the states.45 6
In Southland, the Court held that a California franchise in-
vestment law, which voided a contractual agreement that waived
compliance with its provisions, violated the Supremacy Clause.457
Southland held that, as a federal substantive law, the FAA pre-
empted state laws which "undercut the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements."45 Thus, the California law had to fall.459 In ad-
dition, the Court noted "ambiguities" in the legislative history,460
but nevertheless concluded that Congress "withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
tration clauses not conforming with its requirements violated the Supremacy Clause); see
also Doctors Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that a Montana statute re-
quiring notice that a contract was subject to arbitration be typed in underlined capital let-
ters on the front page of the contract violated the Supremacy Clause because it conflicted
with the FAA).
452. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 384-404 and accompanying text.
454. For a discussion of some important Supreme Court Cases considering the expan-
sion of the FAA, see Hirshman, supra note 368.
455. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (stating that "[Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration"); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)
(holding that the Act was sufficiently outcome determinative to not be applied in a federal
court as a procedural measure).
456. See 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
457. Id. at 16.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 12.
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claims."46 ' The Court based its decision on prior holdings which
found that the Act was a substantive measure passed pursuant to
the commerce power.462 If this had, indeed, been the case, South-
land's holding that the Act was capable of preempting state laws
would naturally follow. However, neither is accurate, and South-
land has added insult to injury. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor,
joined by then Justice Rehnquist, convincingly used direct quotes
from the legislative history to squarely contradict the "ambigui-
ties" and "indications" found by the Court.463 Similarly, other Jus-
tices have noted their disagreement with the Court's holding, ar-
guing that the Act was never intended to apply to the states.4"
The entire purpose of the subcommittee hearings on the FAA
was to convey the need for regulation in the area of interstate
commerce, and this need only arises if the states are free to pass
their own laws regarding arbitration."5 In fact, the very problem
which was meant to be addressed by the Act was that federal
courts would not enforce arbitration clauses, even where a pro-
arbitration state law controlled.466 Much like its decision in Prima
Paint, the 'ambiguities' noted by the Court are explicitly non-
46L Id. at 10. Justice Stevens dissented with regards to this holding. Id. at 17 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). While he felt that Justice O'Connor's dissent legitimately established
that the Act was originally a procedural measure, he was "persuaded that the intervening
developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court has reached." Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). He dissented on the basis that he did not think that all state statutes
which sought to protect parties would be in conflict with the Act. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
462. Id. at 11-12.
463. Id. at 25-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). One commentator has opined that Justice
O'Connor's quarrel is, in fact, with Prima Paint. See Hirshman, supra note 368, at 1345.
464. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens found Justice
O'Connor's review of the legislative history convincing, but felt that "intervening develop-
ments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court' reached. Id. (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see also Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating "I will, however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling
it."); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
465. See also Current Legislation: The United States Arbitration Act, 25 COLUM. L.
REV. 822, 824 (1925) (calling for passage of a "Uniform State Arbitration Act' that would
change the law in those states where arbitration agreements were not yet enforceable).
466. See Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 16. Testimony of Mr. Cohen:
Why do we do that in the Federal Courts? We have it in New York State ....
You have got it in New Jersey.
First of all, it was held that a State statute was not binding in admiralty,
even in the Federal courts.... And the Federal Court will not be bound by
any State statute.
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supportive of the view it chose to pursue. The brief states in sev-
eral places that states were free to do as they wished, which
caused the necessity for the FAA in those situations which arose
when parties from different states entered a contract that would
be heard in a federal court:
It is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself
what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws.
467
To meet the situation where, through dishonesty or mistake or
otherwise, one party to an arbitration agreement refuses to perform
it, statutes such as those adopted in New York and New Jersey are
advocated and have met favor. To correct the same defect and also
assure justice where one of the parties lives in a State not recogniz-
ing arbitration agreements, the present Federal statute is pro-
posed.
468
Every one of the States in the Union might declare such agree-
ment to be valid and enforceable, and still in the Federal courts it
would remain void and unenforceable unless the Supreme Court of
the United States felt at liberty itself to reverse a rule recognized for
centuries. This, in the absence of a congressional declaration, it has
so far felt itself unable to do.
There is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal bludg-
eon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbi-
tration enforcement. The statute can not have that effect. It is de-
sired only that the Federal Government shall declare the validity of
arbitration agreements in the field where necessarily it is supreme
and where without this action no remedial action by the States ever
469can be effected....
467. Id. at 37. "Nor can it be said that the Congress of the United States, directing its
own courts no longer to recognize this anachronism in the law, would infringe upon the
provinces or prerogatives of the States." Id. at 39; see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note
359, at 277.
468. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 35.
469. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 40. Cohen and Dayton stated that:
The rule must be changed for the jurisdiction in which the agreement is
sought to be enforced, and a change in the jurisdiction in which it was made
is of no effect. Every one of the States in the Union might declare such
agreement to be valid and enforceable, and still in the Federal courts it would
remain void and unenforceable without this statute.
See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 359, at 276.
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Further, Congress was told that there was no doubt that "all of
the states would pattern after it."'7 ° If the Court's interpretation
is correct, and the Act was intended to force enforcement of arbi-
tration clauses upon the states, then such assertions and state-
ments would not have been made. The problem was not that the
states would fail to pass legislation that recognized arbitration
clauses, but rather that once a state did pass such legislation, the
federal courts would not enforce it. Thus, it was the acknowledg-
ment that states have the power to recognize or disallow arbitra-
tion agreements that created the need for the Act. However, it is
this very power that the Court is consistently muddling by its
faulty interpretation of the Act. Further, state statutes requiring
the non-drafter to be made aware of the existence of an arbitra-
tion clause in the contract prior to the signing have been struck
down in states that have statutes recognizing arbitration agree-
ments.47' If a state has the ability to not recognize or enforce arbi-
tration agreements, then surely it has the ability to recognize
them and place limitations upon their enforcement. Accordingly,
some states have aggressively refused to accept the mandates of
the Supreme Court.472
3. Right to Trial by Jury
The effect of an arbitration provision is to give one party the
ability to have the case removed from court and heard by arbitra-
tors who are not bound by the law and need not give reasons for
their decisions. While the Supreme Court's arbitration jurispru-
dence has unfailingly supported the Act's power to do this to the
fullest extent possible, the congressmen who passed the Act
clearly were satisfied by repeated assurances that the legal sys-
tem would remain a vital part of the enforcement of arbitration
clauses.
470. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 28 (statement of Mr. Alexander Rose, Arbitra-
tion Soc'y of Am.).
471. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).
472. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Jeffrey, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996) (refusing to apply separabil-
ity); Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995) (finding again, after vacatur and
remand, that the Montana statute was not preempted by the FAA), overruled by Casa-
rotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler,
J., concurring) (holding that a state statute requiring a notice that the contract contains
an arbitration clause appear on first page is not preempted by the FAA).
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There are several points in the history of the FAA where the
proponents heralded the safeguarding of the trial by jury if the
making of the agreement was at issue. The following statement
was made often: "the constitutional right to a jury trial is ade-
quately safeguarded."473 In the House Report, the bill was offered
as "reducing technicality and delay and expense to a minimum
and at the same time safeguarding the rights of the parties."474
Furthermore, the brief stated:
At the outset the party who has refused to arbitrate because he be-
lieves in good faith that his agreement does not bind him to arbi-
trate, or that the agreement is not applicable to the controversy, is
protected by the provision of the law which requires the court to ex-
amine into the merits of such a claim.
475
Despite such statements in the legislative history, the doctrine
of separability, the heralding of the Act as a federal substantive
commerce measure, the extension of the Act's application to con-
sumers and employees, and the Act's ability to strike down state
statutes, all have removed these safeguards and rendered them
largely meaningless in the pro-arbitration environment estab-
lished by the Supreme Court.4 76 Today, these preliminary ques-
tions are routinely sent to arbitrators rather than courts of law.
Thus, the current atmosphere of furthering the availability of
arbitration far exceeds the considerations of Congress and the in-
tentions of the proponents and drafters. Despite the Act's charac-
terization as a procedural measure passed pursuant to Article III,
it is heralded as "national substantive law" passed pursuant to
the commerce power, which "withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims .... .. From a
measure applicable to those who regularly deal in commercial
transactions, it has become applicable to any and all, even if
greatly oppressive. From a protector of the right to a jury trial,
the Act has become the easiest way to bar having the case heard
by a jury. Throughout this history of mischaracterization and
473. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924); Senate Hearings, supra note 359, at 2 (statement
of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Arbitration Comm. of the N.Y. Chamber of Com-
merce).
474. H. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
475. Joint Hearings, supra note 359, at 35 (statement of W.W. Nichols, President, Am.
Mfrs. Exp. Ass'n of N.Y.).
476. See Sternlight, supra note 52; see also Carbonneau, supra note 51.
477. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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misinterpretation, as well as greatly exaggerated application, the
current arbitration environment is a completely different charac-
ter than the Act authorized.
The Federal Arbitration Act was a proper exercise of Con-
gress's authority over the jurisdiction and procedure in the fed-
eral courts. The courts have made the FAA far more powerful
than was intended or authorized by Congress. However, other
PLAs lack even this small amount of congressional sanction,
however wrongfully that sanction has been applied. Rather than
being applied beyond congressional intent, they were actually
created by the courts. Therefore, not only is it necessary for Con-
gress to tighten the expansion of arbitration clauses beyond the
scope of the FAA, but it is also necessary for them to examine
other PLAs and promulgate a system of enforcement that ensures
fairness, because the courts have shown themselves unable to
protect that fundamental right.
IX. WHAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
Were Congress to act, the threshold question would, of course,
be whether PLAs should be recognized and enforced at all. While
an argument can be made that parties should not be allowed to
alter the public procedural system by private agreement, the day
to make that argument seems long gone. More important, how-
ever, is the fact that there does seem to be an appropriate place
for PLAs between entities of equal bargaining power who are
making an informed decision about how to most efficiently resolve
any dispute that may arise between them. That inexorably leads
to the most important question that Congress should resolve: In
what situations and among which types of parties should PLAs be
recognized?
While there is a place for PLAs entered at arm's length be-
tween entities of equal bargaining power, the PLA contained in a
consumer contract packaged inside of a consumer good seems
fundamentally unfair. Similarly, the PLA contained in a contract
for employment presents the same opportunity for over-reaching.
Therefore, it is imperative that the legislative process be utilized
to draw the difficult line between the appropriate and inappro-
priate application of PLAs. This decision should involve consid-
erations of the type of party, as well as the substance of the un-
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derlying contract. Both need to be fully considered to determine
the proper use of the PLA.
Resolution of questions of proper contract formation should fol-
low directly. PLAs buried in multiple pages of a consumer con-
tract contained inside a boxed good do not support even a fiction-
alized notion of mutual assent. However, the method in which
these issues should be resolved can only be properly addressed af-
ter deciding who may be the proper parties to the PLA, and under
what circumstances the PLA should be enforced. It would be silly
to legislate a font requirement for a PLA between two corporate
entities represented by counsel. At the same time the placement,
font, and timing of the PLA is imperative in a consumer contract
if fundamental fairness is to be assured.
Having determined in what situations PLAs may be utilized,
fundamental questions of enforcement must be addressed. The
present judicial view of PLAs as "super contracts" cannot be justi-
fied. If deference is to be given to autonomy to enter contracts,
traditional contract defenses must not be rendered meaningless
for the sake of enforcing PLAs. Also, there is no logic to support
the present approach which supports a deference to private con-
tractual autonomy, while at the same time reversing the normal
view of when enforcement should be ordered by means of specific
performance or injunction. Therefore, the notion of considering
fraud in the inducement of the PLA portion of the contract as a
question separable from fraud in the inducement of the substan-
tive portion of the contract should be discarded.
Additionally, the traditional burdens from contract law should
be restored to the question of whether enforcement by means of
injunction or specific performance is appropriate. That is, it
should be the burden of the party seeking what is otherwise
viewed as an extraordinary contractual remedy to establish that
the underlying agreement is fundamentally fair. Finally, Con-
gress should consider whether a statutorily imposed measure of
damages should be determined for a situation where a party
seeks to breach a PLA. Determining an appropriate amount of
monetary damages for a suit filed in a forum other than the con-
tracted-for forum, a suit filed in court that was contracted for ar-
bitration, or a suit subject to a jury demand when that option was
contractually removed is at best illusory, if not impossible. A leg-
islatively determined contractual penalty removes the uncer-
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tainty and serves to make enforcement by means of injunction or
specific performance no longer seem to be the only remedy.
The proper scope of what may be addressed by PLAs should
also be addressed. A threshold question is whether parties should
be limited in the terms of their PLAs to the litigation choices
available under the present procedural system. For example,
should parties by means of a forum selection clause be able to
designate any forum they desire, or should they be limited to the
option available under existing notions of jurisdiction and venue?
How this question should properly be resolved should be largely
dependent upon the resolution of the threshold question of in
what situations and among what types of parties PLAs are
thought to be appropriate. The greater the opportunity for un-
equal bargaining among parties to a PLA, the more attractive the
notion of limiting PLAs to the options of the present procedural
system. Nevertheless, PLAs made as the result of arm's length
bargaining between informed parties of equal bargaining power
do not need the same scope-limiting fallback protection. There-
fore, as with the formation issues, the appropriate resolutions to
these questions are interdependent.
In summary, the authors do not intend to elude these difficult
issues. Nevertheless, the appropriate resolution of any one issue
is dependent upon how any number of others is resolved. At this
time, it seems most appropriate to simply define the terms of the
public debate that is wanting. If and when the stage is set for
resolution, specific legislative proposals can be made as the de-
bate unfolds.
X. CONCLUSION
Simply put, the judicially created doctrine for enforcement of
forum selection clauses, as well as the unwarranted judicially
created extensions of FAA, are a mess. The judicial rush to em-
brace private contractual autonomy that reorders basic concepts
of the public system of dispute resolution has the opportunity for
resultant unfairness to the unsophisticated party to the contract.
The courts seem to have premised their fondness for PLAs upon a
mistaken assumption that parties enter these agreements with
equal bargaining power and understanding of the terms. That is
not the case, especially for the consumer or potential employee.
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The most expedient way out of this mess is for Congress to en-
gage in public debate as to what role, if any, PLAs should play in
public dispute resolution. If it is decided that there is an appro-
priate role for PLAs, the parameters of that role must be estab-
lished so that their beneficial utilization is preserved, but not at
the expense of the consumer or employee. Moreover, not only is
congressional intervention warranted, it is constitutionally de-
manded by notions of separation of powers. As demonstrated by
the legislative history of the FAA, Congress originally acted un-
der its Article III authority. It is only by judicial sleight of hand
that the FAA became viewed as a product of the power to regulate
interstate commerce. As an act pursuant to Article III, it is only
for Congress to define when and in what circumstances arbitra-
tion clauses should be recognized and enforced. They should simi-
larly act for all forms of PLAs.
